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ABSTRACT

Since the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2012, health plans serving Medicare
beneficiaries have begun receiving sizeable incentives (>$1B) for demonstrating high ratings to
quality performance scores in CMS’s Medicare star ratings program. Several of the quality
measures can be directly impacted by retail pharmacists (e.g., medication adherence measures),
resulting in health plans implementing programs designed to incentive retail pharmacies to work
toward improving their own performance related to quality measures. While awareness of these
value-based incentive (VBI) programs is growing, there is still a significant lack of research
which elucidates the nature of these programs and the potential impact they are having on the
field of retail pharmacy. This dissertation attempts to provide a better understanding of the
impact of VBI programs on retail pharmacy through three parts. The first paper provides a
categorization of the three primary strategies which are being employed through current VBI
programs. Furthermore, the paper summarizes and provides anecdotal evidence of five distinct
programs which are being considered or implemented. The second paper explores retail
pharmacy’s perception of the impact of quality measures and VBI programs through quality
research with retail pharmacy managers. The third paper evaluates the financial impact to retail
pharmacies of three potential VBI programs. The results of this dissertation provide a step
forward in exploring how retail pharmacy is being affected by healthcare’s shift toward
achieving quality performance ratings.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background

In 1965, proponents for public health reform passed amendments to the Social Security
Act under President Johnson that effectively created Medicaid and Medicare (Hoffman, 2003).
Medicare exists as a nationally funded and run program that provides health insurance primarily
to the elderly population through payroll taxes on the rest of the population (CMS, 2015).
United States citizens eligible for Medicare include those aged 65 or older, those under 65 with
certain disabilities, and individuals of any age with End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD). Medicare
was further expanded in 2003 with the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act (MMA). The legislation allowed private health plans to also provide
insurance to Medicare beneficiaries, called Part C or Medicare Advantage (MA) plans.
Additionally, the legislation established an optional drug benefit that became available to
beneficiaries in 2006 entitled “Part D” (CMS, 2015).
As the administrative agency of Medicare, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare
Services (CMS) attempts to ensure that its beneficiaries have access to and receive high-quality
health care (APhA, 2013). Considering the increasing costs to Medicare, this mission is as
important as ever. It is for this reason that in 2007, CMS developed a Medicare star rating
system that measures and reports on quality measures associated with Medicare plans (APhA,
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2013). Plans are rated from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 stars representing the highest quality rating a plan
can receive (Jacobson et al., 2011).
The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 designated that MA-only plans
and MA plans with Part D (MA-PD) would begin receiving bonus incentives based upon the star
rating that the plan received (Jacobson et al., 2011). In 2012, these payment models went into
effect, providing bonus payments to plans with 4 or more stars. CMS also launched a 3-year
demonstration project in 2012 granting smaller bonuses to plans rated as average (3 or 3.5 stars)
in the hopes of incentivizing more plans to strive for higher star ratings. Data shows that plans
have continually progressed to higher star ratings since bonus payments were implemented
(HLMedit, 2014).
Star ratings are currently comprised of 47 measures, with Part C plans evaluated with 32
measures and Part D plans evaluated with 15 measures (CMS Star Ratings Technical Notes,
2015). Of the 47 measures, 10 are triple-weighted, which translates into each of the measures
accounting for a much higher impact on a plan’s overall star rating. Of these 10 measures, eight
are considered to be able to be influenced either directly or indirectly by medication therapy
(APhA, 2013). At one point, five of these measures were estimated to account for approximately
19% of Part C ratings and 54% of Part D star ratings. Since then, some measures have changed,
with the current measures most directly linked with pharmacy practice including medication
adherence for three chronic disease states (oral diabetes, hypertension, and cholesterol) and
medication-therapy management (MTM) program completion rate for comprehensive medication
review (CMR). (CMS Star Ratings, 2017)
Given the high degree of influence pharmacists can have on these measures, it is no
wonder that community pharmacies’ influence on star ratings are being more closely considered.
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In fact, payers have now started to utilize data assessing individual pharmacy quality measures to
determine how their performance is impacting the plan’s star ratings (Stolpe, 2015, Smart
Retailing, 2014).

Health Plan Value-Based Incentive Programs
Using plan and third-party data to evaluate individual pharmacy stores’ performance
scores, many MA-PD plans have begun to implement incentive programs that encourage
pharmacies to boost star rating scores (Stolpe, 2015; Deniger, 2015) (Bonner, 2016). These
value-based incentive (VBI) programs include both punishing and rewarding pharmacies in
response to various quality performance metrics. The most common store performance measures
evaluated are the three patient medication adherence measures included in CMS star ratings: oral
diabetes, hypertension, and cholesterol (Rawal et al., 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016). While the
three patient medication adherence scores appear to be the primary focus (SilverScript, 2014;
IEHP, 2016), other plans have utilized additional performance measures including how often the
pharmacy dispenses generic products (when available) over brands, and how often 90 day
supplies of medications are dispensed (Deniger, 2015).
The VBI programs used by healthcare plans to boost performance measures appear to
vary widely. However, several reports on individual plans exist. One VBI program includes
giving bonus payments to pharmacies in response to their performance measures (Logan &
Logan, 2013). In these programs, bonus payments are awarded as lump sums in either regular
intervals or annually to a pharmacy store. Bonus incentive programs appear to be structured in
one of two different schemes: a tournament or threshold system (Rawal et al, 2015). In a
tournament system, the plan allocates one lump sum to split between all pharmacies within their
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network. Pharmacies with higher performance scores get a larger proportion of the bonus
money, with those scoring lowest getting the lowest amount, if any at all. In a threshold system,
pharmacies that meet certain threshold requirements (i.e. store-level adherence for patients
taking oral anti-diabetics at 80%) are awarded with either a flat bonus payment or perhaps a
bonus percentage of all medication transactions with network beneficiaries. In a threshold
system, multiple thresholds can also exist where increasing pharmacy performance ratings
constitutes higher bonus payments (Rawal et al., 2015; Maxwell, 2015).
A second type of VBI program is changing reimbursement fees in response to pharmacy
performance ratings (Maxwell, 2015). In each transaction where the cost of a medication is
reimbursed from a health insurance entity, a dispensing fee for the pharmacist is included in the
total cost. Similar to the threshold system of bonus incentives, the increase to dispensing fee
reimbursement can vary as higher levels of pharmacy performance are achieved.
Another VBI program includes the altering of direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees
(Maxwell, 2015). This can refer to two distinct processes at a pharmacy: 1) the reconciliation of
contractual terms between plans/ pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and pharmacies with
actual reimbursement, and 2) a fee that pharmacies must pay to participate in a network
(Maxwell, 2015). In the course of the many adjudications that occur between the pharmacy and
plan/PBM when patients claim medications, the actual reimbursement owed to the pharmacy is
often not fully realized until a reconciliation occurs after some period. At this time, any
additional reimbursement owed by the plan/ PBM is awarded to the pharmacy. For the “pay-toplay” fees, reports suggest plans might try to incentive pharmacies by reducing the fee for
pharmacies that have high performance scores. The fee is usually attached to each medication
transaction, and reports suggest on average it is around 5% (Maxwell, 2015; Moose & Logan,
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2016). Multiple thresholds of pharmacy performance may again be present in this strategy,
where higher performance ratings a pharmacy achieves results in a lower fee the pharmacy may
have to pay.
The final set of programs includes changes to the pharmacy’s place in a health plan’s
network. Most simply this involves a plan or PBM simply excluding low-performing
pharmacies from their network (Stople, 2015). This can cause potential gains or losses in
pharmacies as pharmacies are included in a network or excluded from it, respectively. Another
variation in network management can involve changes in the form of preferred and non-preferred
network pharmacies (Gebhart, 2014; Fein, 2015). Patients are still allowed to get reimbursed at
all pharmacies; however, patients will have lower co-pays at those are considered “preferred.”
While this practice does not directly reward or punish pharmacies based upon performance
scores, patients may naturally shift their business to pharmacies with lower co-pays, thereby
resulting in more business for such pharmacies (Fein, 2015). In this way, a plan/ PBM can
indirectly reward those pharmacies with high performance scores while simultaneously
punishing pharmacies with low scores. Additionally, the plan might also assume whatever
factors that caused current patients to be more adherent at one pharmacy might improve
adherence for those patients that shift to the “preferred” pharmacy, thereby increasing overall
beneficiary adherence star ratings (Gebhart, 2014).
It should be noted while both sets of network practices existed prior to the advent of the
CMS star rating bonus payments, most network decisions to this point have been based upon
contractual agreements. For instance, employees of large chain pharmacy retail stores often are
required by their insurance provider (i.e. the chain retail pharmacy) to obtain their medications at
the same set of chain retail pharmacies, either by not covering other pharmacies or by providing
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lower co-pays by using the same retail chain pharmacy (Gebhart, 2014). However, as MA-PD
plans continue to strategize how to boost their own star ratings, network change programs are
certainly a viable option that can and are being used. To the principal investigator’s knowledge,
no research has been conducted to acquire a comprehensive understanding of all of the programs
implemented and being considered to date.

Potential Financial Impact of Star Ratings on Pharmacy Stores
To date, there is no literature estimating the overall impact of health plans’ VBI programs
on pharmacies. However, a few reports of how individual pharmacies have been impacted are
available. One report listed a single pharmacy’s experience with a bonus payment incentive
structure (Deniger, 2015). The pharmacy received a total of $1190 in bonus payments
throughout the entire 2014 year. This amount is a reflection of the pharmacy performing highly
on the RAAS agent adherence measure (90.48%) and statin therapy adherence measure
(92.16%), well above the 5-star benchmarks for each group of 84% and 78%, respectively. The
store found that 75% of its patients were adherent to oral diabetes medications, lower than the 5star benchmark goal of 85%. The pharmacy was listed as a medium-load pharmacy, averaging
250-350 prescriptions per day.
Additional reports suggest similar overall payment incentives for pharmacists through
VBI programs (Maxwell, 2015, IEHP, 2016), weighted on the number of beneficiaries the
pharmacy serves. Although the number may seem small at first, a consideration must be made
that there may be as many types of VBI programs as there are unique Medicare programs
represented through patients. Thus, while the impact of individual VBI programs may seem
small, the total impact of all programs may be much larger for pharmacies with high

6

performance scores. Further research is necessary to understand the amount pharmacies can
stand to gain or lose based upon their own performance ratings.

Previous Literature on Provider Performance Programs
Considering the limited literature on pharmacy VBI programs, a look at previous
literature surrounding pay-for-performance incentive programs for other providers is warranted.
The types of physician performance incentive structures include performance bonuses, fee
schedules, and network lockouts. Physician performance bonuses are synonymous with
pharmacy bonus payments, where performance scores can dictate whether and how large
financial bonuses occur (Rosenthal et al., 2004). Fee schedules refer to increases in
reimbursements to fee-for-services models of healthcare, wherein the physician is reimbursed a
specific fee for services rendered. As healthcare shifts to value-based models of reimbursement,
one way to accomplish this is simply applying a value-based “adjustment” to traditional
reimbursements (CMS, 2016). Like this practice for physicians, the dispensing fee adjustment or
DIR fee adjustments based upon performance ratings apply a simple way to incorporate value
adjustments to pharmacy practice as a way to incentivize higher performance ratings.
Unlike the previously outlined VBI programs, “physician tiering” provides an example
of a potential future VBI program for pharmacists (Stone & Sullivan, 2007). Physician tiering
refers using claims data to assess the quality of performance of providers, as well as their costefficiency relative to respective peers. This is differentiated from previous “economic
credentialing”, wherein high-cost physicians were terminated from the network. Physician tiering
places physicians on at least 2 tiers of “preference” for the patient to use the physician. The most
basic form this can take for physicians to be placed on either a “preferred” tier or a “non-
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preferred” tier. Tier placement is commonly based upon cost and quality ratings. The tiers and
ratings are made known to patients, whom are generally steered to higher-performing physicians
(i.e. more “preferred” tiers) through lower copayments. Additionally, physicians on higher tiers
may receive performance bonuses, effectively receiving both direct (bonus payments) and
indirect (more patients) incentives to increase performance scores.
There are several reasons why limited-network benefit designs are more popular than
tiered benefit designs for physicians (Ginsburg & Pawlson, 2014). The first recognizes the
overall complexity of attempting to provide tiering for many different types of physicians.
Furthermore, providing a way for beneficiaries to access and adequately comprehend the
differences between differently tiered entities would be cumbersome. The second reason limited
network benefit structures are more popular is that the access of only a limited amount of
providers, albeit likely more cost-efficient to the plan, allows for a smaller premium to be paid
for by the patient. Finally, many prominent hospitals are resistant to contracting with payers
under a tiered benefit design unless the entire hospital and all of its services/ employees are
placed in the preferred tier. This implies a nationally recognized oncologist and a cardiologist
with terrible patient outcomes who work under the same hospital system would fall under the
same tier. Given many physicians today are employed under a large health system, this presents
a problem.
A tiering design for retail pharmacies might be much more applicable, given performance
ratings, for the time being, appear to be applied to the store-level rather than the individual-level
(Rawal et al., 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016). It is uncertain whether patients might fully
comprehend differential performance ratings a plan might present. However, it is certainly
suggested lower copayments for patients increases patient adherence (Taira et al., 2006), thereby
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increasing pharmacy performance ratings (Chernow et al., 2008). One criticism of physician
tiering is physicians might not always be able to handle higher patient loads as an outcome of
lower payments through a high tier placement (Stone & Sullivan, 2007). Pharmacies are
potentially better equipped to handle higher patient loads in this regard, since an increased
frequency of 10-20 patients per day (300-600 patients per month) might not push pharmacy
resources as much as it might physician office resources. Issues might still arise for large chain
pharmacies in regard to applying a single tier structure to a single entity of the chain.
In conclusion, while most reports of pharmacy VBI programs closely reflect previously
established practices for physician incentive strategies, pharmacists may also need to consider
the possibility of pharmacy tiering as a future incentive program that payers may explore.

Pharmacist Reactions
Currently, there is little literature evaluating pharmacists’ attitudes and perspectives of
plans implementing VBI programs and associated evaluation of store-level quality performance
meausres. Meterko et al. (2006) proposed a conceptual framework of how provider attitudes
toward pay-for-performance programs affect practice behaviors, including how providers
respond to pay-for-performance incentive programs. Their study proposed that three primary
domains affected provider attitudes: the characteristics of the incentive program, the practice
environment of the provider, and the background characteristics of the provider. The
characteristics of the incentive program included the structural features (types of measures, target
recipient, reward mechanism, and availability of feedback), and the communication features. The
practice environment domain was made up of many autonomy, normative, and social support
features such as whether the practice was group or solo, the type of information and support
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systems available, the overall practice culture, experience of the practice executives, and
community practice norms. Finally, the demographic and background domain was thought to
consist of years of practice of the individual, specialty, and whether the participant had a
professional school appointment.
Meterko et al. (2006) also conceptualize seven critical dimensions of provider attitudes
related to quality targets and incentives: 1) awareness and understanding of the incentive
program, 2) salience of the financial incentives, 3) clinical relevance of the quality targets, 4)
control over the resources needed to achieve the quality targets, 5) fairness in the administration
of the incentive program, 6) frequency and nature of performance feedback provided, and 7)
possible unintended consequences associated with the pursuit of the quality targets. The authors
hypothesized that each of the dimensions affected whether a change in practice behavior might
be seen towards achieving quality targets. The authors developed a survey instrument and tested
it in a large sample of physicians to test construct validity of the attitudinal dimensions on
perceived impact of quality targets, and incentives on clinical practice behavior. The authors
found evidence to support most of the dimensions, except for fairness and performance feedback,
for which cooperation (i.e. support from other providers) and perceived impact of the incentive
program were found to be significant dimensions of provider attitudes toward incentive
programs. Meterko et al.’s (2006) work provides a valid basis to consider overall pharmacy
attitudes and behaviors for pay-for-performance programs.
Management theory suggests that many factors contribute to the awareness and strategic
decisions of decision-makers. Work by McMullen & Shepherd (2006) suggests that
entrepreneurs, in response to uncertainty in their environment, engage in a process of attention
and evaluation, where individuals engage in gathering and evaluating knowledge based upon
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characteristics of the individual. This agrees with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who, in
discussing how and when managers may seek information for an area of uncertainty, suggested
that uncertainty by itself would not lead to scanning behavior. Rather, external events would
need to be perceived as important to organizational performance for managers to attribute any
interest to them. In this way, Meterko et al.’s work is in agreement with previous management
theory and attempts to consider the many attributes that a provider may place on the importance
of the external event (i.e. incentive programs), thus affecting their information-seeking and
reactions to these events.
Applied to pharmacy VBI programs, Meterko et al.’s conceptual framework provides a
foundation for considering how pharmacists are reacting to these programs. The framework
compares well to the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985), which suggests that
intentions to change behavior (i.e. try to meet quality targets) are a factor of attitudes, normative
beliefs, and perceived control. Meterko et al.’s model, in finding cooperation as a major
dimension of attitudes through its exploratory factor analysis, essentially broadened many of the
dimensions of TPB. Awareness/ understanding, financial salience, clinical relevance, and
perceived impact might all fall under the broader scope of general attitudes of the TPB.
Likewise, cooperation might be similar to normative beliefs, with taken a step further with not
only the beliefs of what others think should be done, but also help to do so. Finally, control over
the resources needed from Meterko et al.’s model can be seen as synonymous as perceived
control to change behavior. Actual behavioral control (i.e. how well changing behaviors actually
allows one to reach quality measurement target) can also be seen in the same light as unintended
consequences posited by Meterko et al.’s model. Given the high degree of support for the TPB,
recognizing how Meterko et al.’s model fits within the dimensions of it helps provide additional
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support how its framework might provide a sound foundation for understanding how pharmacists
evaluate VBI programs.

12

Research Objectives

Health plans are already considering and implementing various value-based incentive
(VBI) programs to boost star ratings from the pharmacy store-level. However, little literature
has been published outlining the specific programs and the financial impact on pharmacy
practice. Additionally, little published research has considered the reaction of pharmacists to
VBI programs. The following specific aims are designated for this dissertation are:

1. Provide a categorization of strategies employed by known VBI programs and provide
anecdotal evidence of potential programs being implemented by health plans to
incentive improvement of retail pharmacy-related quality measures (Paper 1)
2. Understand pharmacist attitudes and perceptions of quality measures and the impact
of VBI programs (Paper 2)
3. Using Mississippi Medicare claims data, estimate store-level performance to select
quality measures and evaluate the financial impact of possible pharmacy VBI
programs on retail stores (Paper 3)
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF MEDICARE STAR RATINGS ON PHARMACIES:
PAYER STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE PHARMACY PERFORMANCE

Introduction

The landscape of healthcare is slowly shifting in lieu of increased attention to quality
health measures. In 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) announced
their goal of tying 85% of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare payments to quality or value by the
end of 2016. Additionally, DHHS set a goal that 90% of payments were to be tied to quality or
value by the end of 2018 (DHHS, 2015). After the announcement, the Health Care
Transformation Task Force was quickly formed, which is comprised of a large collection of
health plans and employers whose aim is to shift 75% of their operations to contracts designed to
improve health care quality and lower costs by 2020 (Brino, 2015).
The Medicare star rating system was developed in 2007 by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS). The system analyzes Medicare health plans through quality measures
and rates plan from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 stars representing the highest quality rating a plan can
receive (Jacobson et al., 2011). In 2012, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) designated that
Medicare Advantage plans (MA) and MA plans with Part D (MA-PD) would begin receiving
bonus incentives based upon the star rating that the plan received. Sizeable incentives are
provided to those plans with the highest ratings in the star rating system (Galewitz, 2016). Plans
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can also be designated as “low performing” if they receive an overall star rating of less than three
stars for three consecutive years. Medicare members enrolled in “low performing” plans are
notified and provided assistance if they want to shift to a different plan. Additionally, low
performing plans can lose their contract with Medicare (Jacobson et al., 2011). Both the financial
incentives for high ratings as well as the potential for enrollee health plan shifting and contract
termination through low ratings (Herman, 2015) have led most plans to develop strategies to
raise their star ratings. Data from CMS demonstrated an increasing trend in average star ratings
for MA-PD plans from 2012 to 2016 (CMS Fact Sheet, 2016), although the increase has since
plateaued (CMS Fact Sheet, 2018).
With plans working to maximize their own star ratings, pharmacies’ impact on star
ratings have become the focus of much attention and discussion. Recently, it was estimated
pharmacy related measures account for approximately 19% of Part C star ratings and 54% of
Part D ratings (Erickson et al., 2014). While pharmacies’ effect on star ratings has altered some
with the retiring of some measures (“diabetes measurement” as a triple-weighted measure) and
the addition of others (“medication therapy management program completion rate for
comprehensive medication reviews” as a single-weighted measure) (CMS Star Ratings, 2016),
the impact pharmacies can have on Part D and overall plan ratings is still profound.
Consequently, pharmacies are being pressured by MA-PD plans to increase their
performance (Stolpe, 2015). Some reports suggest plans may punish low-performing pharmacies
by locking them out of their network (SilverScript, 2014). This would essentially require any
patients within the plan to shift to another pharmacy for any medications they don’t want to pay
for completely out-of-pocket, resulting in a loss of business for the pharmacy. Other plans are
considering rewarding pharmacies that perform well. For example, a Silverscripts’ program
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rewards pharmacies with bonuses at the end of the year based upon performance on four distinct
star measures as well as the number of patients at each pharmacy (Bonner, 2015).
Research on these value-based incentive (VBI) programs in pharmacy is generally scarce;
however, the literature on how payers have addressed physician benefit structures may provide
some insight. For instance, physician benefit structures typically follow one of three approaches:
changes to fee schedules, limited-networks, and more recently, physician tiering (Rosenthal et
al., 2004; Stone & Sullivan, 2007; Ginsburg & Pawlson, 2014). Changes to fee schedules
directly affects the net compensation provided to the healthcare practitioner (Rosenthal et al.,
2004), while limited-networks and physician tiering may affect patient behaviors by either
encouraging or deterring patients from going to particular practitioners (Stone & Sullivan, 2007).
Incentivizing prescriber behaviors directly and incentivizing patient behaviors (and thus
indirectly practitioner behaviors) can be used independently or in conjunction with one another.
Limited networks are more popular than physician tiering, but that is mostly due to issues with
effectively tiering physicians who are not in private practice and also adequately informing
beneficiaries of the differences between tiers for providers (Ginsburg & Pawlson, 2014). Limited
networks and fee schedules in the form of bonus payments are already previously referenced as
possible mechanisms that may be used in response to pharmacy quality performance.
The primary aims of this paper are to provide a categorization of strategies employed by
known VBI programs and to collect anecdotal evidence of programs being implemented by
health plans to incentivize improvement of retail pharmacy-related quality measures.
Furthermore, the paper seeks to identify and explore quality measures being monitored and
utilized in VBI programs. Anecdotal evidence and information gathered from a survey are used
to help achieve these aims.
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Types of VBI Strategies

There are three types of VBI strategies readily identifiable in the literature. The first two,
quality payment opportunity (QPO) and value-based contracting (VBC), directly impact a
pharmacy’s potential revenue through financial rewards offered or punishments levied against a
pharmacy. The third strategy, quality-based network (QBN), indirectly impacts a pharmacy’s
potential revenue through affecting the patient volume of a pharmacy. The three types of VBI
strategies are shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 2-1. Three Types of VBI Strategies

Quality Payment
Opportunity
(QPO)
Value-Based
Incentive (VBI)
Strategies

Value Based
Contracting
(VBC)
Quality Based
Network
(QBN)

Strategies directly impacting practice revenue
(often referred to as “pay-for-performance”)
Strategies indirectly impacting practice revenue

The QPO strategy is defined as optional rewards or payments dispersed for meeting
specific goals set by a health plan. These goals are often associated with pharmacies achieving
high performance on quality-based measures, such as the medication adherence measures used in
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CMS star ratings (Jhawar & Rabbitt, 2016; CMS Star Ratings, 2016). One example comes from
Inland Empire Health Plan (IEHP), which awards bonus payments every 6 months to retail
pharmacies within its network for meeting specific quality measure metrics, including high rates
of patient adherence to diabetes, hypertension, and cholesterol medications (Bonner L, 2016).
These additional payment opportunities do not affect contractual agreements between the health
plan and pharmacies (e.g., dispensing fees) and offer few disadvantages as they strictly provide
optional benefit for those able to achieve specific criterion pre-defined by health plans.
VBC is broadly defined as a strategy where the specific terms of contracting with a
practice are adjusted based upon performance. Whereas QPO only offers potential rewards for
high performance, VBC can be risk-sharing and associated with both rewards and penalties
related to performance. One of the most widely recognized forms of VBC in retail pharmacy is
through adjustment of direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees based upon quality
performance. DIR fees typically encompass “pay to play” fees for network participation
between pharmacies and health plans or pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (NCPA, 2017). In
relation to quality measures, health plans can reduce the DIR fee assessed to the pharmacy for
achieving higher quality measure ratings, thereby rewarding the pharmacy (Maxwell, 2015;
Moose & Logan, 2016). Alternatively, poor pharmacy performance could result in a higher DIR
fee for the pharmacy.
Both QPO and VBC strategies are often collectively referred to as “pay-for-performance”
(P4P) strategies in the literature. The term “P4P” broadly characterizes any strategies which offer
financial incentivization for achieving good quality outcomes for patients (James, 2012) and is
widely recognized both inside and outside the scope of incentive strategies related to pharmacies
(e.g., physician practices) (Mendelsen et al., 2017). The term has been associated with retail
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pharmacy since at least 2008, when David Nau of the Pharmacy Quality Alliance (PQA) insisted
P4P programs would soon be implemented to boost pharmacy performance scores (Drug Topics,
2008).
The third strategy, QBN, is sometimes referred to as a “narrow network” strategy. QBN
is defined as a strategy where practices are rewarded or punished through directing patients
toward or away from the practice based upon performance scores. Narrow network models are
often described as being implemented as preferred or limited networks (DST Health, 2018). In
preferred networks, members can visit any pharmacy but are incentivized through lower costsharing to visit specific pharmacies. In limited networks, members are only allowed to use
specified pharmacies. Historically, plans have implemented narrow networks for reasons beyond
quality performance ratings. This paper defines the different models of narrow networks as forms
of QBN strategies to make the distinction of narrow network models influenced by quality
performance and not other causes (e.g., contracting agreements).

Implementation of VBI Strategies

Utilizing information gathered from conversations with content experts, conference
presentations, and available literature, 5 distinct examples of the three VBI strategies emerged as
being considered, if not already implemented, for retail pharmacy. While the VBI “strategy” is
used to define the three major approaches to achieving higher performance from retail
pharmacies, VBI “program” will be used to refer to the actual plan or system of action (i.e.,
actual implementation) to achieve such goals (program, 2019). The “bonus payments” program
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was the only example of a QPO strategy identified. For VBC, two specific examples were
identified: “DIR fees” and “medication reimbursement adjustment.” For the QBN strategy,
“tiered network” and “limited network” programs were identified. A brief description of each
can be found in Table 1.

VBI Strategy
Quality
Payment
Opportunity
(QPO)
Value-Based
Contracting
(VBC)

Quality-Based
Network
(QBN)

TABLE 2-1. Description of Five Types of Potential VBI Programs
Example Programs
Description
Specific to Strategy
Bonus Payments
Pharmacies receive bonus payments based upon their quality
performance ratings. VBI programs may differ in the size of
bonus, eligibility requirements necessary to receive a bonus,
and intervals between bonus payment distributed.
DIR Fee Adjustment

Pharmacies are assessed a fee for participating in health plan /
PBM network for Medicare Part D plans, labeled a DIR fee.
Typically assessed as a flat fee per-claim or as a flat percentage
that is assessed at regular intervals. An example VBI program
may reduce the fee based upon high quality performance
ratings.

Medication
Reimbursement
Adjustment

The total reimbursement to the pharmacy per each prescription
claim is adjusted based upon pharmacy quality performance
ratings. This can be achieved either through the actual
medication reimbursement given to the pharmacy being
adjusted or the dispensing fee included as part of medication
reimbursement being adjusted. Adjustments can be either
increased or lowered, based upon whether higher or lower
quality performance ratings are achieved.

Tiered Network

Pharmacies in a health plan’s / PBM’s network are classified in
distinct levels of preference (e.g., "preferred", "non-preferred")
based upon quality performance ratings. Patients receive
incentives (e.g., lower copays) for going to "preferred"
pharmacies instead of "non-preferred" ones.

Limited Network

Pharmacies with poor quality performance in a health plan's /
PBM’s network are excluded from the network. Due to patient
access considerations, this is not always feasible for all
pharmacies.
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Identified VBI Programs
The bonus payments VBI program represents the sole example of a QPO strategy
currently identified as being used with retail pharmacies. For this program, pharmacies are paid a
bonus based upon their performance on meeting specific goals set by a health plan. The amount
of bonus provided can range depending on the specific criteria described, with some programs
distributing single-store bonuses as high as $40,000 per quarter based upon quality metrics (Chan
& Sega, 2016). Alternatively, some programs may offer only minimal bonuses (e.g., $1,000)
even for relatively high-performing stores (Deniger, 2015). While the bonus payment program
was the only example of a QPO strategy identified, there are conceptually other ways a program
could be developed which reflects a QPO strategy. For example, a pharmacy could be paid an
additional incentive to provide a service which has been shown to have a beneficial impact on
performance ratings, such as the implementation of a Med-Sync program (Painter et al., 2015).
Med-Sync is a pharmacy workflow model designed to help pharmacies better manage patients
and their prescriptions though monthly appointments and scheduled interactions and has
demonstrated improvement in adherence for patients (Krumme et al., 2018).
The first example program of a VBC strategy is adjustment of a pharmacy’s DIR fee.
DIR fees are well-documented (Balick, 2018; Millonig, 2018) and are already being
implemented. As alluded to earlier, this “pay to play” fee for network participation can be
reduced in a DIR fee program if high performance ratings are achieved. For example, if a plan
typically charges a DIR fee of 3 to 5% of the drug cost for each medication claimed from the
pharmacy, high performing pharmacies may have their fee reduced to 3% whereas low
performing pharmacies have to pay the maximum 5% (Moose & Logan, 2016). The second
example VBC program, medication reimbursement adjustment, refers to the altering of the
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reimbursement of services or medications for pharmacies based upon performance ratings (Lenz
& Monaghan, 2011). For example, the dispensing fee or amount of reimbursement associated
with each medication dispensed from a pharmacy may be adjusted either higher or lower,
depending on the performance of the pharmacy. While not a well-documented program, there
appears to be ongoing discussions of how it could be implemented (Lenz & Monaghan, 2011). It
should be noted both programs are sometimes described simultaneously as “DIR” programs. DIR
fees can encompass both network participation fees as well as periodic reimbursement
reconciliations or alternative fees incurred between a retail pharmacy and health plan or PBM
(NCPA, 2017). While a medication reimbursement adjustment program may fit within such a
definition, this may unnecessarily create confusion in practice when attempting to refer to one
program or another. Instead, this paper will distinguish the two programs in definition, allowing
“DIR fee” to refer solely to network participation fees.
The VBI programs identified as examples of the QBN strategy generally follow the trend
set by narrow networks in either being a “preferred” or “limited” network (DST Health, 2018).
In the former, members can visit any pharmacy but are incentivized to visit specific pharmacies
through lower-cost sharing at the preferred pharmacy. While often dichotomous (i.e., preferred
vs. non-preferred), it has been suggested preferred networks could be expanded to include more
than 2 “tiers” of pharmacies, each with different levels of cost-sharing. In this way, poorly
performing pharmacies may be penalized by being designated as a “non-preferred” pharmacy
with higher patient cost-sharing, rather than be excluded from a network. Given this insight,
instead of utilizing “preferred networks” to describe potential programs which remain open for
members but have preferred pharmacies, the term “tiered networks” will be used to refer to any
open network where plans place pharmacies on distinct tiers in order to influence the pharmacies
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patients utilize. In “limited network” programs, pharmacies may be excluded from a health
plan’s network for poor performance. While these programs are discussed as being considered
and implemented (SilverScript, 2014), there are issues which may limit their utilization. For
example, in rural areas where there are limited pharmacy options, it may difficult to restrict
patient access to pharmacies by excluding pharmacies, regardless of individual pharmacy
performance.

Characteristics of VBI Programs
Beyond understanding how each VBI program’s structure and outcomes differ, it is also
important to understand how performance in these programs are evaluated to determine
outcomes. First, each program must decide on which metrics to utilize to evaluate performance.
Medicare Part D star rating measures are those most commonly mentioned as being used when
monitoring and / or making decisions on outcomes associated with VBI programs (Maxwell,
2015; Bonner, 2016; Jhawar & Rabbitt, 2016; Moose & Logan, 2016). Adherence measures are
of particular interest for payers, given the continuity of being able to apply them to all retail
pharmacies. Currently, the three adherence measures included in star ratings are for
hypertension, diabetes, and cholesterol medications (CMS Star Ratings, 2017). Display measures
(e.g., avoidance of drug-drug interactions) are mentioned as being monitored but not necessarily
used in evaluations yet. Additionally, Medicare Part C star rating measures and CAHPS ratings
are identified as potential measures payers may be monitoring or evaluating as measures of retail
pharmacy influence. Other measures which may be monitored by plans include percentage of
generic products dispense over brand equivalents and number of 90-day supplies dispensed for
chronic medications (Deniger, 2015).
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Once the performance metrics have been decided, a program must then determine how
the metrics translate into program outcomes. For example, what percent of a store’s patients must
be adherent to their diabetes medications to receive a bonus? This is generally accomplished
through one of two performance evaluation methods: “threshold” or “tournament” performance
measure evaluation (Drug Topics, 2008; Cromwell et al., 2011). Each type of evaluation can be
summarized as such:
•

Threshold system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon whether the pharmacy
meets specific thresholds (i.e. at least 90% of patients being adherent to oral diabetes
medications or at least 85% of patients being adherent to all three medication adherence
quality measures).

•

Tournament system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon how pharmacies'
quality performance ratings compare to other pharmacies within a specified network
within the plan. In this type of system, the best performing pharmacies would receive the
highest bonus in a bonus payment program or the lowest fee assessed in a DIR fee
program.

Additionally, plans can implement both types of evaluation in determining program outcomes for
pharmacies. An example would be that all pharmacies that meet a certain threshold are in
competition for rewards in a bonus payment program. Pharmacies that don't meet the threshold
are not be eligible for the rewards.
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Evidence Collected Through Survey

To further supplement anecdotal evidence, an exploratory survey was developed and
administered to a sample of healthcare plan directors. The survey sought to collect information
on quality measures being monitored and utilized to influence VBI program outcomes, whether
select VBI programs had been implemented, and health plan perceptions of select VBI programs.
The survey’s focus on VBI programs was limited to the programs identified earlier in the paper,
although respondents were allowed the opportunity to describe other plans or quality measures
with responses.
The survey was evaluated and refined by experienced qualitative interview academics as
well as a pharmaceutical marketing consultant who specializes in qualitative research with
healthcare plans. Face and content validity of the survey was evaluated through a small sample
of knowledge experts within the field of pharmacies and Medicare star ratings. These included
individuals located in third-party businesses associated with measuring pharmacy performance
scores and leading researchers in the field. Additionally, a small pretest was conducted with
policy directors of national and regional health plans to identify any potential issues and ensure
no meaningful omissions were present in response choices. Only minor changes to the survey
were incorporated at the conclusion of the pre-test.
A convenience sample of national health plan directors were recruited through personal
interactions at two national pharmacy conferences, survey distribution by the Pharmacy Quality
Alliance (PQA), and available email lists from conference workshops focused on quality
measures. Additionally, a snowballing technique was used (Bowling, 1997), where respondents
were asked to suggest other individuals in separate plans that might also be eligible to participate
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in the study. Screener questions were included to ensure that only individuals who take part in
decision-making processes regarding programs directed at improving a plan’s star ratings
through pharmacies were included in the study. An incentive was provided in the form of an
executive summary of the study results. A total of 9 individuals met the screener criteria and
completed some portion of the survey between June to August 2017. While 2 respondents did not
fully complete the survey, their responses were still included to provide as much information as
possible on payer perceptions of quality measures and VBI programs.
In the survey, respondents were asked to rate their perception of perceived effectiveness
for each of the three VBI strategies to increase quality performance ratings of retail pharmacies
on a 5-item scale from “not at all effective” to “extremely effective.” For the QPO strategy, 2
respondents (22%) answered “very effective, 4 (44%) answered “moderately effective”, and 3
(33%) answered slightly effective. For VBC, 1 (11%) answered “extremely effective”, 1 (11%)
answered “very effective”, 4 (44%) answered “moderately effective”, 1 (11%) answered slightly
effective, and 2 (22%) answered “not effective at all.” For QBN, 1 (11%) answered “extremely
effective”, 3 (33%) answered “moderately effective”, 4 (44%) answered slightly effective, and 1
(11%) answered “not effective at all.”
Survey respondents were also asked to rate their perceptions of effectiveness for the five
identified VBI programs and likelihood to implement each program to incentivize pharmacies to
improve quality measure ratings. A full description of responses can be found in Tables 2 and 3.
For VBI programs which could conceptually have both a threshold and tournament
structure implemented (programs associated with QPO and VBC strategies), respondents tended
to report a higher level of perceived effectiveness with a combination structure over threshold or
tournament structures alone. A combination approach for the bonus payment programs was rated
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as moderately effective or better for 63% of respondents, compared to 50% and 38% for
threshold and tournament structures, respectively. For the DIR fee adjustment program, a
combination approach was rated as moderately effective or better for 71% of respondents
compared to 57% and 43% for threshold and tournament structures, respectively. For
reimbursement adjustment, 57% of respondents perceived moderate effectiveness or better for a
combination approach compared to 29% and 43% for threshold and tournament structures,
respectfully. Given the limited approaches to QBN programs, it was decided a combination
structure would be unlikely and no rating option was given. Between threshold and tournament
structures for QBN programs, respondents rated higher perceived effectiveness for threshold
structures for both tiered programs (71% moderately effective or better vs. 57%) and networklockout programs (57% vs. 29%).
Three respondents reported having already implemented at least one VBI program with
their plans. One health plan had implemented two distinct bonus incentive programs which
awarded pharmacies a bonus if certain thresholds were met in a given calendar year. Another
health plan had adopted a tiered network program with a threshold structure, although the
respondent provided no additional information about the program. The final respondent reported
a DIR fee adjustment program based upon a threshold-structure as well as a QBN program which
implemented both a tiered and limited network approach using thresholds. When no program had
yet been implemented, most respondents rated a higher likelihood to avoid programs associated
with VBC and QBN strategies compared to the bonus payment program (QPO strategy).
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28
7
7
7

7
7

7
7

Tiered Network
Threshold structure
Tournament structure

Limited Network
Threshold structure
Tournament structure

7
7
7

DIR Fee Adjustment
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
Combination of both structures

Medication Reimbursement
Adjustment
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
Combination of both structures

8
8
8

Bonus Payments
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
Combination of both structures

14%
14%

14%
14%

14%
14%
14%

0%
0%
0%

0%
13%
13%

29%
57%

14%
29%

57%
43%
29%

43%
57%
29%

50%
50%
25%

29%
14%

29%
43%

14%
14%
43%

43%
14%
57%

25%
13%
50%

29%
14%

29%
14%

14%
29%
14%

14%
29%
14%

13%
25%
0%

0%
0%

14%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

13%
0%
13%

TABLE 2-2. Perceptions of Select VBI Programs
Perception of effectiveness for each type of VBI program (% respondents)
# of
Not effective
Slightly
Moderately
Very
Extremely
responses
at all
effective
effective
effective
effective

29
7
7

7
7

Tiered Network
Threshold structure
Tournament structure

Limited Network
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
0%
14%

0%
0%

14%
14%
14%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

*Percentages only account for those who have not adopted program

7
7
7

7
7
7

DIR Fee Adjustment
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
Combination of both structures

Medication Reimbursement
Adjustment
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
Combination of both structures

8
8
8

Bonus Payments
Threshold structure
Tournament structure
Combination of both structures

67%
57%

20%
57%

29%
43%
43%

20%
43%
43%

17%
13%
25%

17%
14%

60%
29%

43%
29%
14%

60%
57%
29%

50%
75%
50%

17%
14%

20%
14%

14%
14%
29%

20%
0%
14%

33%
13%
13%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
14%

0%
0%
13%

TABLE 2-3. Perceptions of Implementing Select VBI Program
Likelihood to adopt each VBI program* (% respondents)
# of
Definitely
Probably
Might or
Probably
Definitely
responses
not
not
Might not
yes
yes

1
0

2
0

0
0
0

1
0
0

2
0
0

Program
Already
Adopted (#)

Both the 2017 final CMS star ratings as well as draft technical notes for the 2018 CMS
star ratings were used as a foundation for current and potential quality measures (CMS, 2016;
CMS, 2017). The list of measures to include in the survey was refined after conversations with
industry experts, and additional select CAPHS and other measures were included which were
noted during information conversations. A full list of all measures included in the survey, along
with responses to whether the measures were being monitored and / or used in decision-making,
are available in Table 4.
The measures most reported to being used to influence pharmacy payment and / or
network decisions included non-insulin diabetes medication adherence (50%), antihypertensive
medication adherence (38%), cholesterol medication adherence (50%), and percentage of generic
products dispensed over brand equivalents (50%). Other measures reported to being used to
influence pharmacy payment and / or network decisions included medication therapy
management (MTM) program completion rate for comprehensive medication reviews (CMRs),
antidepressant medication adherence, asthma medication adherence, annual influenza
vaccination, and number of 90-day supplies dispense for chronic medications. CMS Part D star
rating active measures and display measures were generally monitored by most respondents.
Only one CMS Part C stars rating measure was reported to be monitored: administration of the
pneumococcal vaccine.
No respondent reported currently using case-mix adjustment (i.e., factoring in
sociodemographic information of the patient population the pharmacy serves) for pharmacies
when evaluating quality performance ratings. When asked the likelihood to adopt case-mix
adjustment in the future, 2 (29%) reported “probably yes”, 2 (29%) reported “might or might
not”, 2 (29%) reported “probably not”, and 1 (14%) reported “definitely not.”
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CMS Part C Display Measures
Administration of pneumococcal vaccine (where
appropriate)
Drug treatment of COPD with bronchodilators or
systemic corticosteroids as appropriate

CMS Part C Measures
Osteoporosis management in women who have had a
fracture
Glucose control in diabetes patients
Blood pressure control

CMS Part D Display Measures
Avoidance of drug-drug interactions
Avoidance of excessive doses of oral diabetes
medications
Ensuring statin use in patients with diabetes age 40 to 75
years
Appropriate use of high-risk medications in patients 65
years or older

CMS Part D Measures
Medication adherence: non-insulin diabetes medications
Medication adherence: hypertension medications (RAS
antagonists)
Medication adherence: cholesterol medications (statins)
MTM program completion rate for CMRs

0%
0%

8

0%
0%

8
8

8

0%

0%

5

8

0%

7

0%
0%

25%
13%

8
8

8
8

25%
13%

8
8

0%

0%

0%
0%

0%

0%

0%

0%
0%

13%
0%

13%
13%

0%

0%

0%
0%

0%

0%

0%

0%
0%

13%
13%

13%
13%

0%

13%

0%
0%

0%

20%

25%

60%
50%

25%
25%

25%
25%

100%

88%

100%
100%

100%

80%

75%

40%
50%

25%
50%

25%
38%

TABLE 2-4. Respondent Choices to Quality Measures Being Evaluated
How measure is utilized by respondent plan (% respondents)
Influences
Influences
Influences
BOTH
Only
Not
# of
pharmacy
pharmacy
pharmacy
monitored at
monitored at
responses
payment
network
payment and the pharmacy the pharmacy
decisions
decisions
network
level
level
decisions
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Respondent Reported Measures
Antidepressant medication management – continuation
phase
Medication adherence: asthma medications

Other Measures
% of generic products dispensed over generic
equivalents
# of 90-day supplies dispensed for chronic medications

CAHPS Measures
Patient experience in getting a needed medication
Annual influenza vaccine

1

100%

100%

13%

8

1

25%

0%
20%

8

5
5

0%

0%

0%

13%

0%
0%

0%

0%

13%

13%

0%
0%

0%

0%

25%

25%

0%
0%

0%

0%

50%

25%

100%
80%

TABLE 2-4. Respondent Choices to Quality Measures Being Evaluated (continued)
How measure is utilized by respondent plan (% respondents)
Influences
Influences
Influences
BOTH
Only
Not
# of
pharmacy
pharmacy
pharmacy
monitored at
monitored at
responses
payment
network
payment and the pharmacy the pharmacy
decisions
decisions
network
level
level
decisions

Discussion of Findings and Implications for Retail Pharmacy

To date, little research is available which has categorically summarized the types of VBI
strategies being utilized in retail pharmacy. Furthermore, this paper attempts to integrate insight
from pharmacy conferences, literature, and informal conversations with industry experts to
define specific VBI programs being implemented for each strategy. Additional programs may
also be under consideration and / or implemented which were not captured by this paper.
The VBI programs identified parallel different approaches to trying to change retail
pharmacy behavior through operant conditioning (McLeod, 2007). Operant conditioning
proposes a given behavior can be affected by 3 types of responses: reinforcement, punishment,
and neutral action. Reinforcements attempt to increase the probability of the behavior being
repeated, punishments attempt to decrease the probability of the behavior being repeated, and
neutral actions neither attempt to increase or decrease behavior. Furthermore, reinforcements and
punishments can be classified as either positive or negative, depending on whether a stimulus is
added (positive) or removed (negative).
QPO programs are most likely to encompass a type of positive reinforcement where
pharmacies are positively rewarded with monetary gains for improving quality measure ratings.
For VBC, programs which impose a DIR fee then offer reductions for high performance ratings
reflect negative reinforcement; a negative stimulus (i.e. DIR fee) is removed as quality
performance ratings are improved. Adjustment of medication reimbursement based upon
performance ratings, dependent upon how implemented, can encompass either positive
reinforcement or positive punishment or a combination of the two. QBN programs are
interesting, as they indirectly influence pharmacy revenue via influencing patient behavior. They
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simultaneously encompass both positive reinforcement and negative punishment techniques.
Pharmacies with high performance have the potential to gain patients either through being a
preferred pharmacy or not being excluded from a network (positive reinforcement), whereas
pharmacies with poor quality performance ratings may have patients directed away from them
(negative punishment).
Literature does not provide a resolute answer as to which approach may work best for
changing pharmacy behavior to strive for higher ratings. Pharmacists’ perception of the reward
(reinforcement) or punishment would have to be taken into account for each individualized plan.
While it is outside the scope of this paper to suggest which types of VBI programs may be
successful using operant conditioning theory, future research should take these principles into
consideration.
When considering the specific quality measures and how they are evaluated to determine
program outcomes, it is interesting that survey respondents appeared to favor evaluating
performance based on a combination of both the threshold and tournament-based structures,
rather than standalone approaches. Combination approaches do allow for more flexibility in how
rewards and punishments are determined. As previously described, a plan could set a threshold at
which all pharmacies above the threshold would receive a bonus payment. However, the bonus
payment may be dependent on comparison to quality ratings achieved by other pharmacies above
the threshold. A minimum bonus could be set while allowing for the option to gain more based
upon network performance. This would incentive pharmacies to hit a minimum threshold for
bonus payments while rewarding those who strive to achieve more. Even for VBC programs this
flexibility may allow unique ways to incentivize retail pharmacy.
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It makes sense survey respondents would favor a threshold-structure for QBN programs
rather than a tournament structure. Plans are likely limited in how they can even implement QBN
programs based upon how it affects pharmacy access for their plan members. Setting minimum
thresholds to achieve not being locked out of a network or being considered a “preferred”
pharmacy are easier to be implemented and more consistent than tournament systems, which
would change pharmacy standings within the network in regular intervals.
While not fully described in this paper, many of the identified programs can be
conceptually tied together to form more complex programs. For example, a plan may implement
a single program where pharmacies are given the choice to participate in a DIR fee program
while excluding non-participating pharmacies from the network or designating them as a “nonpreferred” pharmacy with higher patient co-pays associated with the pharmacy. Similarly, QPO
programs could be combined with VBC programs in unique ways such as reducing DIR fees if
certain quality rating thresholds are met while also offering bonuses based upon quality
performance comparisons to other pharmacies within the network. Much more research is
necessary to understand the many different programs being considered and implemented to
incentivize higher quality performance ratings from retail pharmacy.
As would generally be expected, plans appear to be closely following CMS Part D star
ratings for measures associated with retail pharmacy practice. Part D measures are those most
closely related to pharmacy practice and it intuitively makes sense they would be the primary
conduit by which VBI programs are implemented. Some plans may be following display
measures closer than others, attempting to potentially set baselines for measurement and
preparing for if the measures become active. While few Part C star ratings were noted to be
monitored, other plans may be utilizing closer partnerships with retail pharmacies within their
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network to help improve these ratings. Additionally, some plans appear to be considering
additional quality measures beyond CMS star ratings. One survey respondent reported utilizing
adherence measures for antidepressants and asthma medications, which are measures in the
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) used to evaluate commercial health
plans. Other plans are similarly looking to other ways retail pharmacy can help improve the
quality of care provided toward their patients.
One interesting finding is plans are utilizing measures other than star ratings or other
nationally accepted quality measures. Multiple survey respondents reported using the number of
90-day supplies dispensed for chronic medications and the percentage of generic products
dispensed over generic equivalents as influencing pharmacy payment (e.g., bonuses, DIR fees) or
network decisions. Research by Matlin et al. (2015) suggest 90-day prescriptions result in better
patient adherence over filling 30-day supplies. However, others contend health plans’ inclusion
of 90-day supplies as a quality measure is primarily driven by financial incentives to do so
(Deniger, 2016). Similarly, research suggests generic fills are associated with greater patient
adherence (Briesacher et al., 2009). In some instances, such as narrow-spectrum diseases like
epilepsy where changing a patient’s prescription may de-stabilize control of the disease, pushing
for medication switches (i.e., brand to generic) may actually cause harm to a patient. Measures
such as these will need to be carefully implemented to avoid such situations.

Limitations

A few cautions should be taken into consideration for the present paper. First, while
references were ascribed where possible, the informal nature of how information was gathered
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results in some of the paper relying on the authors’ personal experiences. Additional research is
certainly warranted to confirm the paper’s findings and conclusions. However, the
categorizations of VBI strategies may still serve as a basis for discussions of potential ways
health plans may pursue in developing and implementing VBI programs. Second, the survey
responses should only serve to provide insight instead of developing conclusions for how health
plans are pursuing higher quality ratings from retail pharmacy. This limitation should already be
expected but a word of caution is still warranted. The limited sample size and convenience
sampling technique used for the survey exacerbates this issue through sampling biases which are
likely present, including nonresponse bias.

Conclusion

Although awareness and knowledge of quality measures and VBI programs is growing,
there is still a lack of comprehensive understanding of the programs being considered and
implemented by health plans. This paper provides a categorization of potential VBI strategies
being employed and presents anecdotal evidence of the associated VBI programs being
considered and implemented. Much more research is necessary to fully understand the variety
and complexity of programs being implemented. Doing so benefits multiple stakeholders,
including pharmacists, policy makers, researchers, and even health plans seeking to gain insight
into how to best adapt to the changing environment. Furthermore, understanding the broad scope
of programs being implemented now helps to direct conversations to how they can be improved
and foster creative discussion on new programs which may be developed. As VBI programs
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continue to evolve and reshape the focus of retail pharmacy, so too will research need to be
directed at shedding light into these changes.
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CHAPTER 3: RETAIL PHARMACY’S ATTITUDES ON QUALITY MEASURES AND
POTENTIAL HEALTH PLAN VALUE-BASED INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

Introduction

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the
one that is the most adaptable to change.” – Leon Megginson (1963)

The above quote, in reference to works by Charles Darwin, is often the inspiration behind
one of the more recognized idioms in the world of business: “Adapt or die” (McCallum, 2001),
which implies that it is those who strive to constantly change to account for the shifting business
environment that are able to remain sustainable. Examples of businesses that have not heeded
this philosophy, and were consequently forced to close, include Kodak (Mui, 2012), Blockbuster
(Satell, 2014), and Borders Books (Sansburn, 2001). For the field of healthcare, pharmacy
managers may also be facing a period of environmental shift that requires attention and the
adaptation of pharmacy practices to survive.
In 2014, the Affordable Care Act began providing bonus payments to Medicare
healthcare plans based upon quality performance measurements (HLMedit, 2014). These
payments are part of a larger shift in reimbursements from traditional fee-for-service (FFS) to
quality or value-based models (DHHS, 2015). The various Medicare quality performance
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measurements make up what is known as the Medicare Star Ratings, a system whereby plans are
rated from 1 star to 5 stars, with 5 stars denoting the highest quality. Plans with at least 4 stars
are eligible to receive bonus payments (Jacobson et al., 2011). In response to this healthcare
plans have begun to consider ways to maximize their star ratings to receive these bonus
payments. Data suggest many performance measurements, particularly those related to Medicare
Part D, can be highly impacted by pharmacies (Erickson et al., 2014). As such, plans are now
evaluating how to prompt pharmacies to increase quality and in turn boost their own
performance measures (Stolpe, 2015).
Recently, reports have begun to surface detailing different value-based incentive (VBI)
programs being implemented by health plans and PBMs to incentivize pharmacies to boost
pharmacy-related quality performance ratings. One plan incentivizes pharmacies used by their
beneficiaries by offering bonus payments to the pharmacies themselves based upon the
performance measurements (IEHP, 2016). Another has warned pharmacies within their network
they will stop providing reimbursements for patients visiting their pharmacy if their performance
measure ratings are too low (SilverScript, 2014). Additional reports have described how some
plans are incentivize pharmacies through reduction of fees required for a pharmacy to participate
in a health plan’s network (i.e., “pay-to-play” fees, also known as DIR fees) (Maxwell, 2015;
Moose & Logan, 2016).
As such, pharmacy owners and managers are certainly interested in understanding how
they might be impacted by these new reimbursement models. Monitoring systems, such as the
Electronic Quality Improvement Platform for Plans & Pharmacies (EQUiPP) that help
pharmacies measure and understand their own performance scores have recently gained
popularity (EQuIPP, 2016). This system provides data on individual store performance scores as
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well as provides organizational, statewide, and national comparisons. Additionally, reports and
discussions on how pharmacies might adapt to the changing environment have been presented at
various national pharmacy meetings (Maxwell, 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016). However, little
research has gathered feedback from members of the retail pharmacy community, to whom VBI
programs are directed, regarding their perceptions of quality measures and associated VBI
programs.
The following study sought to understand the perceptions of knowledgeable retail
pharmacy managers regarding quality measures, VBI programs, and their impact on retail
pharmacy practice. Using managerial cognition theory, the study proposes to understand
pharmacy managers’ awareness, evaluation, and actions in response to the increasing pressure to
maximize performance measurements. Additionally, the study will seek to uncover pharmacy
managers’ attitudes and perceptions of potential VBI programs used by healthcare plans.

Methods

The research was conducted using qualitative interviews. A semi-structured interview
approach was taken with managers or other pharmacy employees whose job responsibilities
included understanding quality measures and helped determine how their pharmacy(ies) should
react.
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Interview Guide
The interview guide was developed around Meterko et al.’s (2006) conceptual framework
of provider attitudes to pay-for-performance incentive programs. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
designate for a manager to be aware and engage in information seeking to act upon external
events, the manager must first consider the external event important. To understand this,
multiple dimensions of how a provider might react to uncertainty in the environment (e.g., VBI
programs) is necessary.
The framework, conceptualized by Meterko et al. (2006), suggests incentive program
characteristics, environment characteristics (e.g., culture of the work environment, resources
available), and provider characteristics influence a provider’s attitudes towards the incentive
program. The framework also states provider attitudes are made up of many different
dimensions affecting providers’ behaviors toward seeking to achieve quality targets of incentive
programs. Evidence suggesting convergent and discriminant validity has been observed for the
model.
The framework’s theoretical dimensions are comparable to those engendered in the
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985). For example, attitude dimensions of
awareness and understanding, clinical relevance, and financial salience might reflect the overall
attitudinal dimension of TPB. Additionally, cooperation from other colleagues might reflect
normative beliefs of TPB, with control over resources needed to achieve quality targets reflecting
perceived control of TPB. While Meterko et al.’s framework has much less empirical evidence
and support compared to TPB, Meterko et al.’s framework was selected as the foundation for
constructs to test when interviewing pharmacists due to its specific application in describing
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health provider decision-making, particularly relating to meeting quality targets and reacting to
performance measurements.
Specific attitudinal dimensions chosen to be tested include awareness and understanding
of VBI programs, financial salience, clinical relevance, perceived impact, control, and
cooperation. To provide context to discussion of VBI programs and attitudes surrounding them,
three types of programs were reviewed with respondents: 1) pay-for-performance models, 2)
value-based contracting models, and 3) quality-based networks. Demographic data of the
individuals were captured, along with information-gathering sources and use of evaluation
systems (i.e. EQuIPP). The interview guide was refined through multiple rounds of evaluation
and critique by experienced qualitative interview academics. Additionally, a small convenience
sample of two pharmacy managers were recruited to pre-test the guide to test face and content
validity. Both respondents reported no issues with the guide and so no additional changes were
made.

Sample
A total of 15 pharmacists were recruited through a purposive sampling approach. An
initial sample of 15 pharmacists was chosen with the possibility for additional interviews if
saturation was not met within the initial set of interviews. To account multiple viewpoints within
community pharmacy practice, a minimum of 5 large chain drug stores and 10 independent
pharmacies were recruited. For those within the large chain retail setting members of upper level
management, who were more informed of broad-level decision-making, were targeted instead of
managers of individual pharmacies or district managers. For independent pharmacies, owners of
the pharmacy or those in charge of managing the pharmacy(ies) associated with the independent
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practice were targeted. Potential candidates were identified through the Association of Managed
Care Pharmacy (AMCP) annual conference and through various pharmacy organizations,
including Health Mart, the nation’s largest pharmacy services administrative organization
(PSAO) for independent pharmacies (McKesson, 2014). Potential participants were screened to
determine they were aware of quality measures and VBI programs and to determine if their job
responsibilities included assessment and responding to pharmacy quality performance measures
on behalf of the pharmacy. Additionally, a snowballing technique was used to identify
additional respondents. Interviews were conducted through scheduled 45-minute telephone calls.

Analysis
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions of the interviews were
analyzed using thematic content analysis (Grbich, 1999). This type of analysis involves the
broad categorization of interview responses, with further sub-categorizations defined as coding
of the interviews occurs. Braun & Clark’s (2006) six-phase framework was used as the basis for
conducting the content analysis. All transcripts were first read, then initial codes generated
which consolidated text relevant to one of the 6 themes pre-designated from Meterko et al.’s
framework. Sub-themes were then developed, refined through multiple reviews of the text, and
eventually defined for the purposes of the study.
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Results

Interviews took place from August 2016 to April 2017. A point of saturation, where no
additional information emerged from respondents, was met once the initial 15 interviews were
complete, so no additional pharmacies were sought. Interviews ranged from 34 minutes to 58
minutes in length, with an average time of 44 minutes. Demographic data for respondents are
available in Table 1. All chain pharmacies captured within the study owned at least 50
pharmacies within their organization. For independent pharmacies, both single stores as well as
multiple store businesses were represented, with two respondents representing at least 6 stores
within their business. The Midwest census region was the most represented U.S. region by
respondents, with 10 (66.7%) respondents having stores located within the region. Conversely,
the West was the least represented, with only 3 (20%) respondents having stores located within
the region.
Table 3-1. Respondent Demographics
Pharmacists
(n=15)
%
(no.)
80%
12
20%
3

Gender

Male
Female

Time Spent as a Pharmacist

Less than 1 year
2 to 3 years
4 to 10 years
11 to 20 years
Over 20 years

0%
6.7%
0%
46.7%
46.7%

0
1
0
7
7

Number of Pharmacy
Stores Within Business

1
2 to 5
6 to 20
21 to 50
Over 50

26.7%
26.7%
13.3%
0%
33.3%

4
4
2
0
5

Census Region(s) Where
Pharmacy Store(s) Located

West
Midwest
South
Northeast

20%
66.7%
53.3%
26.7%

3
10
8
4
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Twelve themes were identified from each of the concepts outlined in Meterko et al.’s
framework. In the following section, each theme will be discussed under the category it most
resembles.

Awareness and Understanding
This category was associated with two themes. First, respondents felt very aware and
knowledgeable of star rating measures and the VBI programs health plans were implementing to
incentivize higher ratings. Respondents reported they kept informed as possible to appropriately
prepare their pharmacy, with one respondent stating, “We are trying to do our best to educate
our staff and our people on what our plans are doing to try to plan for the future.”
The second theme was associated with a desire for more transparency in health-plan
sponsored VBI programs, specifically in how thresholds and rewards / fees were calculated. In
particular, the pharmacists believed they were not provided enough information to consistently
predict the amount of reward received (e.g., pay-for-performance) or fee assessed (e.g., DIR fee)
based on their pharmacies’ ratings. One respondent expressed their frustration in the perceived
lack of transparency, stating, “As far as the methodologies that [health plans] use it's very, very
confusing. I've probably taken an extensive time to try to research it and ask different sources
and try to remain as objective as possible. As much as anybody can understand it, I attempt to
learn but it is difficult. It's very, very difficult. I think it's that by design.”

Clinical Relevance
The themes of overall good for patients, further development is needed, and overall
good for the profession of pharmacy were identified for clinical relevance. Respondents
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believed quality measures helped create better patient engagement through promotion of better
identification of and intervention with at-risk patients (e.g., those with poor adherence). One
respondent stated, “I think it’s incredibly good for patients. As much work and as much
headache as all of this creates for me as an owner, for trying to account for the lesser
reimbursements and the trouble that we’re having financially with all of that change – to me, the
patient does stand to benefit greatly from this new model.”
However, respondents also wished to see further development of measures and programs
to ensure the right approaches were being taken to provide quality care for patients. One
respondent posed the question, “Are we chasing the right things for quality? That will become
the bigger question as we go forward. Right now, there are flaws with measuring adherence. We
use claims data. Just because somebody pays for something doesn’t mean they are actually
going to take it.”
Many respondents also expressed a desire for more direct collaboration with health plans
for individual patients and having VBI programs more directly tied to patient outcomes (e.g.,
reduction in A1C for diabetic patients). One respondent described a collaborative pilot program
within their state they would like to see more of from plans in the future: “Our pharmacists will
be assigned to patients at the beginning of the calendar year and they will follow those patients
for an entire year and the plan is supplying clinical data to our pharmacist through a portal. It is
a pilot right now. The pharmacist will be incentivized based on being able to lower A1C, for
[improving] blood pressure, and for asthma related measures. There will be a payment just for
the intervention, like there would for any MTM, but the incentive payment for the outcomes is
huge compared to what a normal MTM would reimburse.”
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Regardless, all respondents agreed quality measures and VBI programs are positive for
the profession of pharmacy, as they readjust the focus of pharmacy practice from being
“transaction-based” to individual patient care, push pharmacies to play a larger role in patients’
healthcare, and open the door for better relationships with both patients and other providers. One
respondent suggested, “We’re going to work ourselves to irrelevancy if we focus on product only
and this is a good impetus to push the practice of pharmacy in the direction it needs to go,”
while another stated, “It's going to make collectively us strive to do a better job.” Another simply
said, “This is why you went to school be a pharmacist.”

Perceived Impact
Three themes were identified related to perceived impact: two associated with impact to
the pharmacy, significant impact to how pharmacy is practiced and significant resources
required, and one associated with impact to the patient, positive impact on patient health. In
an effort to improve quality measure ratings, respondents reported they have re-evaluated and
altered how they approach engaging with patients. All respondents have adapted to using
EQuiPP to track their ratings, with many also implementing their own internal system systems of
measurement to help identify patients with poor adherence. Some pharmacies have implemented
more proactive patient engagement structures, such as Med-Sync: a pharmacy workflow model
designed to help pharmacies better manage patients and their prescriptions though monthly
appointments and scheduled interactions (Painter et al., 2015).
Other pharmacies have even altered the pharmacy structure itself to provide a better
“counseling” area or room where more comprehensive discussions with patients can take place.
To this end, one respondent stated, “We have to transition to where we are more accessible to
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the patients and that, in turn, will increase your quality ratings.” One respondent stated that
pharmacy practice has traditionally been “set up to be a transactional thing: get them in and get
them out as fast as you can.” They also stated pharmacy is shifting, due to quality measures, to
require a more “relational component. Pharmacists need to have a system and a process in place
that they are making the most of working with a patient.”
To accommodate these changes, respondents argued the need for pharmacies to invest
significant resources. Respondents mentioned needing to spend time to reevaluate and
implement new processes, reallocating pharmacist and / or technician time, and purchasing and
learning new technology (e.g., software) to assist in improving ratings. In adapting to shifting
practice patterns, one respondent stated trouble with “finding the time, that's the biggest thing.
Also identifying a workflow, workflow that accommodates both a clinical initiative and still
having to dispense and fill prescriptions at the same time.” Additionally, respondents noted the
need to educate pharmacy staff on the importance of quality measures as well as devoting time
and other resources to remaining aware of any and all changes in the environment which may
affect their practice(s) (e.g., new quality measures).
Despite the significant changes and resources required, respondents believed quality
measures generally result in a positive impact on patient health. Respondents reported better
overall care was being provided to their patients due to a focus on improving quality measure
ratings, with one respondent stating, “at the end of the day we have greater pharmacy
engagement with patients related to their medication therapy, which is always a positive thing.”
Furthermore, respondents believed they could see the positive impact on patients whom had been
intervened on due to trying to improve ratings. One respondent described the benefit for patients
by saying, “We know driving better adherence certainly leads to healthier patients which then

49

keeps them out of the hospital and lowers healthcare costs, overall. Everybody wins in that
arena. I think it is extremely important.”

Control
Two themes emerged related to the Control category. First, respondents believed
pharmacists have enough control in patient interactions to affect quality measures.
Respondents reported at least at a basic level, the choice of pharmacists to intervene with patients
will have an overall positive effect on outcomes such as medication adherence and patient health.
One attributed the ability of the pharmacist to affect quality measures through pharmacists “still
having the trust of the public... as the experts on medications” and “accessibility, because we’re
in the community, we’re here, they can call us up at any time – that is what kind of sets us apart,
I feel like, from other healthcare professionals.” Most respondents felt the shift to deeper patient
engagement has led or can lead to greater response of patients to pharmacist intervention, with
one stating “We've seen it here by solving problems for patients, fixing gaps in care that they've
got.”
However, it was quickly noted this is not true for every patient, as each patient is
ultimately responsible for their own healthcare. One respondent voiced their frustration saying,
“I have some hard headed customers, they are going to do it the way they want to do it
regardless. That negatively affects me and my score when I can’t make that person do [what they
need to].” Respondents pointed out how some pharmacies may contend with a higher prevalence
of patients who do not respond to pharmacist intervention, which resulted in discussion of the
second theme: a need for community-level adjustments. For example, quality performance
ratings of pharmacies located in communities with a large percentage of patients with poor
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adherence could be slightly adjusted to account for the inherent adherence issues which may be
beyond the control of the pharmacist (i.e., risk-adjustment). One respondent stated, “I think it is
going to be necessary, particularly if we want to go to the next level with star measures in
looking at some sort of composite quality rating. You are definitely going to have to consider risk
adjustment.”

Cooperation
Two themes were associated with Cooperation. The first theme, a good opportunity for
cooperation, reflected sentiment that, in general, respondents felt quality measures provided a
chance for pharmacists to facilitate better working relationships with other health professionals.
However, actual experiences varied greatly between respondents. One respondent stated, “The
collaboration piece is very important, and I think that's where healthcare is kind of moving. The
problem is getting the physician or the other parts of the healthcare team to recognize
pharmacists as a peer because right now we're working against in the way pharmacy is
perceived, and that's as dispensers.” Most respondents who had positive interactions with other
health professionals reported it was due to proactively developing collaborative relationships and
the successful demonstration of the quality of care provided to patients through the pharmacy.
The second theme identified was pharmacists’ desire for better technology to interact
with other health professionals. Respondents felt technology which facilitated better
communication between health professionals could allow pharmacists to continue building
relationships with other health professionals and establishing pharmacists as integral members of
the healthcare team. For example: access to electronic medical records (EMR). One respondent
described their desire for pharmacists “[to be] able to look and see adherence scores on the
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patients so they can actually see real-time how the patients are doing, and then how we can see
and look and see how they're doing at their clinic visits, you know, if the changes we're making
for better adherence are actually affecting the patients' blood pressure, affecting their
cholesterol scores, just seeing that changes we're making are actually having a difference, and
then so providers can also see that the patients are actually taking their medications. If they're
not, then they might want to know that data so then they aren't falsely increasing their blood
pressure medication.” Respondents believed this would not only facilitate better cooperation
with health professionals, but also result in a more comprehensive approach to patient care.

Financial Salience
One primary theme was prevalent throughout discussion regarding the perceived
financial salience of quality measures: current VBI programs do not adequately incentivize
pharmacies to achieve high quality measure ratings. Most respondents felt current VBI
programs fell short in the rewards provided for achieving high ratings, such as through the
amount of reward received through programs which provide bonuses for high performance.
Another example given was the perceived insufficient reward associated with reducing the
required network participation fee (i.e., DIR fee) by achieving high performance. Given the
perceived need to expend additional resources to achieve higher quality ratings, respondents felt
current programs did not adequately reward the effort to achieve high ratings, or that only few
pharmacies were able to achieve sufficient reward. One respondent summarized general
sentiment best by stating, “I don’t know of any [VBI program] I like. I would say that we are
probably still moving towards that formula that works best and aligns incentives as we go
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forward. I don’t have any idea what the timeline is for us to see that. It is out there, and we will
get closer to it, at least.”
Programs which provided more of a “stick” approach, such as implementing a DIR fee
and decreasing the level of fee with higher ratings, were viewed negatively and as only
motivating pharmacies due to a fear of losing money. One respondent stated, “You're not trying
to actually beat or exceed anything. You're not trying to be first in the class, you're just trying
not to fail,” a sentiment reflected by several respondents that punishing programs only motivated
a minimal effort to not have poor ratings. Still, respondents were willing to pursue higher ratings
in the hope achieving higher ratings would, in the future, result in rewards commensurate with
the effort.

Discussion

The results of the study capture the perspectives of pharmacists actively engaged in
understanding and adapting to pharmacy-related quality measures and the programs being
implemented by health plans to incentive higher ratings. Fifteen pharmacy managers
representing both large chain retail as well as independent retail pharmacies were interviewed.
Under the pre-designed themes from Meterko et a.’s framework of awareness and understanding,
clinical relevance, perceived impact, control, cooperation, and financial salience, 12 subthemes
were identified from interviews. While several concerns were voiced regarding the resources
required and change necessary to achieve high ratings, the sample generally favored the impact
of quality measures on the profession of pharmacy and the quality of care provided to patients.
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These results match those of other studies which also captured positive overall positive attitudes
of pharmacists to the implementation of quality ratings (Teeter et al., 2016)
Given the study recruited pharmacists with responsibilities associated with understanding
and helping adapt their pharmacies to quality measure ratings, it comes as no surprise the sample
was knowledgeable about current measures and those being discussed for future implementation
(i.e., display measures). Despite the desire for the pharmacists to fully understand their
environment, especially the VBI programs being implemented within their own pharmacies, the
perceived lack of transparency associated with VBI programs is of concern. In particular, this
appears to be a missed opportunity for health plans to better motivate pharmacies through a clear
articulation of program incentives. As stated by several of the respondents, closer collaboration
between pharmacists and health plans on development and implementation of VBI programs in
the future may also help bridge this gap in communication.
As pharmacists form opinions of quality measures and VBI programs, the ethical
obligation of pharmacists to focus on the well-being of their patients is likely to play a prominent
role in the formation of their overall attitudes. Therefore, it is important for pharmacists to be
able to perceive a clinical relevance in quality measures before they are willing to seek
improving their own ratings. The study participants largely voiced their approval of quality
measures in this way. This is further exemplified through positive attitudes regarding how
pharmacists perceived the profession evolving due to quality measures and VBI programs.
While there was a clear perception of clinical relevance, several barriers were noted by
respondents which may or may not be able to be addressed as quality measures and VBI
programs continue to evolve. While most respondents believed pharmacists had enough control
to significantly impact pharmacy-related quality measures (e.g., adherence measures), a desire

54

for ratings to take into account community-level variables (i.e., risk-adjustment) was prominent.
Currently, no quality measures or display measures include risk-adjustment, and it is unclear
how much health plans employ risk-adjustment in their own calculations of ratings.
The respondents’ desire to cooperate more closely with health plans may also suggest an
indirect feeling of lack of control related to performance programs. Pharmacists may not get to
contribute much feedback to the development or implementation of VBI programs. Many may
only get to choose how to react instead of proactively engaging with plans to develop mutually
agreed upon approaches. Feelings of lack of control may also manifest in cooperation received
from other health professionals. For example, some pharmacists may face barriers when
attempting to work with other health professionals to achieve higher quality ratings for patients
(e.g., getting prescription changed to resolve an issue causing poor adherence for the patient).
Further research is necessary to understand how perceptions of control may affect the intended
behavior of pharmacists in meeting and / or exceeding quality measure targets.
The perceived lack of financial salience is consistent with emerging research on VBI
programs (NCPA, 2018). Coupled with pharmacists’ perceived impact on resources (e.g., time,
money) to adapt to quality measures, pharmacists’ overall intention to try to achieve high ratings
may be dampened over time. No previous research has analyzed the impact of financial
incentives on pharmacist attitudes of behavior compared to other constructs such as subjective
norms or perceived professional obligation. Furthermore, it is too soon to determine whether
attitudes of lacking financial incentive will even remain given the currently evolving nature of
VBI programs. As new programs are developed and existing ones adjusted, health plans and
researchers may wish to evaluate the long-term impact of financial salience and resource
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investment required to how motivated pharmacists are to achieve and sustain high quality
ratings.

Limitations

As with all qualitative research, several limitations are worth noting. First, respondents
may have been subject to providing socially desirable answers in their responses (i.e., social
desirability bias). The study sought to minimalize this bias by building rapport with respondents
through informal communication prior to interviews. Additionally, respondents were assured
there were no right or wrong answers and informed of possible dissenting views to ensure
truthful answers were given. Finally, the primary investigator attempted to probe when
hesitations were present in respondent answers or when discrepancies occurred within the
interview. For example, when respondents appeared vocally negative about quality measures but
stated they believed they were positive for the profession of pharmacy, their responses were
queried further to gain better understanding of respondent perceptions and ensure consistency of
responses.
Second, respondents may have been subject to a choice-supportive bias within their
responses. This is the tendency for respondents to ascribe a positive attribute to a previous choice
made by an individual (Mather et al., 2000). The pharmacists had all committed some level of
resources to adapting to quality measures, even if just regularly reviewing EQuIPP scores,
meaning there is a higher likelihood for desiring validation for their actions. To minimize this
bias, respondents were asked to present both the opportunities and challenges associated with
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quality measures and VBI programs in a balanced approach. However, respondents were fairly
open in responses and were very willing to discuss challenges currently present, despite their
committal to adapting to quality measures.
The third limitation which may be present is related to the subjective interpretation of
qualitative research. The interview guide attempted to keep questions straightforward to
facilitate clear answers from respondents, reducing the likelihood for responses to be misinterpreted. Furthermore, the author re-reviewed themes multiple times once identified to ensure
consistency in interpretation to responses.

Conclusion

The present study suggests pharmacists who are actively engaged in understanding and
responding to star rating measures and VBI programs have generally positive attitudes toward
the evolving pharmacy environment. Opportunity exists for health plans and pharmacists to
work together to address adjust quality measure ratings and further develop VBI programs which
better align clinical relevance with financial salience and account for perceived pharmacist
control. Additional research is necessary to fully understand the relationships between
pharmacist attitudes of star ratings and VBI programs to behavioral intention to adapt pharmacy
practices to achieve high ratings.
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CHAPTER 4: ESTIMATING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF POTENTIAL MEDICARE
VALUE-BASED INCENTIVE PROGRAMS ON RETAIL PHARMACY

Introduction

Value-based incentive (VBI) models of healthcare are quickly becoming an integral part
of how healthcare is funded in the United States. Since 2010, the Star Rating system provides
bonuses to Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicare Advantage with Part D (MA-PD) plans
based upon a set of quality performance measures for Part C and Part D services (Galewitz,
2016; Jacobson et al., 2011). Medicare Star Ratings performance measurements for Part D
include adherence scores for three medication classes: oral anti-diabetics, renin-angiotensinaldosterone system agents, and cholesterol medications (CMS Star Ratings, 2016). Community
pharmacies are in a prime position to help improve overall adherence scores for plans, as
literature supports the positive effect retail pharmacists can have on patient medication adherence
(Lee at al., 2006; Murray et al., 2007). Furthermore, pharmacies are in a position to influence
other Star Rating performance measures, such as provision of medication therapy management
(MTM) services and annual vaccinations (CMS Star Ratings, 2016). The multiple direct and
indirect ways pharmacies can impact Star Ratings, which were previously estimated to be as high
as 19% of Part C star ratings and 54% of Part D ratings (Erickson et al., 2014), have caused
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healthcare plans to begin implementation of VBI programs for incentivizing pharmacies to
engage in improving performance scores (SilverScript, 2014; IEHP, 2016).
Given the relative infancy of these programs in community pharmacy, it comes as no
surprise information is limited on the programs being considered and implemented by health
plans. Available anecdotal information suggests multiple distinct ways in which the dynamic
between pharmacies and health plans are changing (Rawal et al., 2015). Some plans have begun
implementing bonus payment programs, whereby pharmacies who achieve distinct thresholds of
performance scores or are among the highest performing stores in their network receive bonus
payments from the health plan (IEHP, 2016). In some programs, pharmacies’ fee to participate
in the network is affected by quality measures (Balick, 2018), while others are discussing
adjustment of medication reimbursement or dispensing fees based on performance scores (Lenz
& Monaghan, 2011). A few plans have considered completely removing low-performing
pharmacies from their networks (Maxwell, 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016).
In addition to only limited information available on implemented programs, there is even
less information on the financial impact these programs are having on community pharmacies.
One case report lists the financial impact of a single bonus payment VBI program on the
pharmacy as being $1,190 in bonus payments (Deniger, 2015). This is a reflection of achieving
adherence performance scores higher than the 5-star benchmark in two out of the three adherence
measures. The pharmacy in question was considered a medium-size pharmacy, filling
approximately 250 to 350 prescriptions per day. While the report gives a glimpse of how
pharmacies might be impacted, further research is necessary to fully comprehend the financial
impact VBI programs will have on retail pharmacy.
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The purpose of the study was to evaluate potential VBI programs health plans might
implement for community pharmacies in their network. For multiple stakeholders, including
individual store managers, the study provides insight into how potential programs may
financially impact community pharmacies.

Methods

A retrospective study was conducted using 2016 Mississippi Medicare administrative
claims data to compute pharmacy performance scores and estimate the impact of potential payer
VBI programs. The study was approved by The University of Mississippi Institutional Review
Board (IRB).

Data Source
Mississippi Medicare claims data were made available as de-identified files for the
calendar year of 2016. Encrypted IDs for beneficiaries and pharmacy stores were utilized to link
data between files. Use of these data was covered by a data use agreement (DUA) between The
University of Mississippi’s Centers for Pharmaceutical Marketing and Management (CPMM)
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

Pharmacy Performance Measurement
Pharmacy performance was operationalized as the percentage of Medicare patients
associated with a given pharmacy who met criteria to be defined as “adherent” to a subset of
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medication adherence measures. The calculations predominantly reflect methodology for the
three triple-weighted adherence measures used in star ratings for the following diseases: diabetes
mellitus, hypertension, and cholesterol (CMS Star Ratings, 2015). Therapy classes comprising
the diabetes measure included biguanides, sulfonylureas, thiazolidinediones (TZDs), DPP-IV
inhibitors, incretin mimetics, meglitinides, and SGLT2 inhibitors. The hypertension measure was
comprised of renin angiotensin system (RAS) antagonists, including angiotensin converting
enzyme inhibitors (ACEI), angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs), or direct renin inhibitors. The
cholesterol measure was comprised of HMG-CoA inhibitors, otherwise known as “statins”.
Combination therapies containing any of the eligible active ingredients were also included in
measure calculations.
The first step included calculating the medication adherence for each Medicare patient
across the three adherence measures. Proportion of days covered (PDC) was used to calculate
adherence for eligible patients. The PDC is calculated as the percent of days in the measurement
period accounted for by prescription claims for the same medication or medications contained
within the same therapeutic category (CMS Star Ratings, 2015). A patient was defined as
“adherent” for each measure if they achieved a PDC of ≥0.8 (i.e., patient was covered by
medication claims for at least 80% of the measurement period). Each patient’s measurement
period was defined as the period beginning on the date of the first prescription of the calendar
year and ending on the last day of the year, the last day covered by the final prescription if not
covered until the end of the year, or date of patient’s death. Prescription data from mail-order
pharmacies was not included in the analysis, as it is not typically available to be utilized in CMS
Star Ratings.
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Eligible patients included those who were 18 years or older (as measured by the last day
of the measurement year) with at least two fills of medication(s) across any of the drug classes
during the measurement period. Patients were also only included in the measure calculation if the
first fill of their medication occurred at least 91 days before the end of the enrollment period.
Patients with ESRD coverage dates were excluded as is consistent with star rating adherence
measures. In addition to these requirements, two adherence-specific exclusions were included.
For the diabetes adherence measure, patients with one or more fills for insulin were excluded
from the denominator. For the hypertension adherence measure, patients with one or more fills
for sacubitril / valsartan were excluded from the denominator. As long as eligibility criteria were
met, patients could serve as a denominator for all three adherence measures. In this way,
medication adherence as a dichotomous variable was defined for patients across the three
different adherence measures.
Pharmacies were attributed to patients based upon previous fill history for eligible
medications in each of the three adherence measures. If medications within the therapeutic
category were filled at multiple pharmacies, the most frequent (i.e., mode) of representative
pharmacies was attributed to the patient. In the event where two or more pharmacies tied for
most frequent fills, the pharmacy visited last in the measurement period was attributed to the
patient. A different pharmacy could be attributed to the same patient across each of the
adherence measures. For example, for a single patient one pharmacy could be attributed to both
the hypertension and diabetes measure whereas a completely different pharmacy be attributed to
the cholesterol measure, based upon fill history across each measure. The decision to attribute
pharmacies as outlined reflects the practices employed by multiple health plans as described by
an advising third-party expert with direct experience of incentive program implementation.
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Store adherence scores were then calculated for each pharmacy over the three therapeutic
categories by dividing the total number of adherent patients (numerator) divided by total number
of eligible patients for the adherence measure (denominator). A minimum number of
denominator patients for each adherence measure was required to calculate the associated
adherence measure performance score (described more in payer incentive programs). While in
actual practice individual Medicare plans would generate their own store performance scores, for
this analysis all available patient data was utilized to generate one global score for each
adherence measure to provide simplicity in evaluation of VBI programs associated with
adherence measures.
Only pharmacies designated as a “community/retail pharmacy” for the primary dispenser
type were included in the analysis. Examples of pharmacies excluded under this designation
included long-term care pharmacies, clinic pharmacies, and nuclear pharmacies. The “dispenser
class” variable, which helps distinguish between independent pharmacies, chain-store
pharmacies, etc., was used to exclude “alternate dispensing sites”, those pharmacies which do
not fit into typical descriptions for retail pharmacies.

Payer Incentive Programs
Three programs were chosen for evaluation after a comprehensive literature search and
discussions with experts in implemented payer incentive programs. The three programs chosen
were a bonus payment program, a medication reimbursement adjustment program, and a limited
network program. Given the variety of potential options, choice of the three programs was based
upon feasibility of available data to determine program outcomes and generalizability for other
pharmacies. For example, bonus payments are well-recognized for already being implemented
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(IEHP, 2016) in retail pharmacy. Details of implemented programs are generally lacking in
literature and reports, so characteristics were designed based upon available information as well
as guidance from third-parties with expertise in implemented payer incentive programs.
Bonus Payment Program. Bonus payments are distributed to pharmacies based upon
whether store adherence to individual measures met pre-defined thresholds. Store adherence
thresholds were set at 80% and 90% for each adherence measure (i.e., 80% or 90% of all eligible
patients attributed to the pharmacy classified as “adherent”). For pharmacies achieving 90%
store adherence for a given measure, $60 was paid per compliant patient. The amount was
chosen as a conservative estimate of reimbursement for an hour’s worth of MTM services
(Lewin Group, 2003). It is reasonable to assume a pharmacist may spend an extra hour’s worth
of time per patient over the course of a year to promote adherence. For pharmacies achieving
80% to 90% store adherence, bonus payments were halved to $30 per compliant patient. No
bonus was awarded for store adherence below 80%. Since outcomes of the program were not
associated with negative consequences (e.g., penalties), only a minimum of 10 denominator
patients were required to be considered eligible for the program.
Medication Reimbursement Adjustment Program. Pharmacies received bonuses or were
penalized based upon how much their store adherence deviated from the mean store adherence
for each adherence measure. Pharmacies achieving a store adherence ≥1 standard deviation from
the mean adherence for each measure received a 1% bonus, based upon total drug costs accrued
for all patients included in a store’s adherence for the measure. Similarly, those achieving ≥2
standard deviations from the mean resulted in a 2% bonus. Conversely, those whose store
adherence for measures was ≤1 and ≤2 standard deviations from the mean resulted in 1% and 2%
penalties, respectively. To ensure sufficient sample size to determine whether a pharmacy should
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be rewarded or penalized, a minimum of 30 denominator patients were required to be considered
eligible for the program.
Limited Network Program. There are generally reasons beyond adherence measures
which influence a plan’s decision to exclude a pharmacy, such as whether there are any
reasonable pharmacy alternatives which could serve patients if a given pharmacy was excluded.
Instead of utilizing adherence measures to describe the effect of a limited network program, an
analysis of the impact of losing an individual Medicare plan was chosen. Two levels of analysis
were chosen based upon the total amount of drug costs associated with the plan: pharmacies’
largest individual Medicare plan and a “typical” plan, operationalized as a pharmacy’s median
plan. The relative impact of both levels of Medicare plans, including patient size, number of
prescriptions, and associated drug costs were described.

Analysis
Descriptive statistics (mean, median, etc.) of each program’s financial impact (in dollars)
on community pharmacies was calculated and reported. Subgroup analyses on total Medicare
prescription volume and pharmacy type (independent vs. chain) were conducted to understand
how the impact differed for multiple groups. Where available, the difference in groups was
analyzed to determine if there was a statistical difference. For comparisons with a dichotomous
dependent variable, a chi-square analysis was used. For comparisons with a continuous
dependent variable, an independent samples t-test was used when comparing two groups,
whereas a one-way ANOVA was used when comparing more than two groups. Significance was
set at 0.05 for all tests.
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Results

A total of 713 retail pharmacies met eligibility criteria to be included in the study.
Among the pharmacies, 307 (43%) were identified as independent pharmacies, 394 (55%) as
chain pharmacies (defined as part of a group of 4 or more under the same ownership), 9 (1%) as
franchise pharmacies, and 3 (<1%) as government pharmacies. Subgroup analyses were only
conducted between independent and chain pharmacies due to lack of sample on other types.
Franchise pharmacies are independently owned but affiliated with another company, resulting in
shared resources and the other company’s brand. It is difficult to accurately determine whether a
franchise pharmacy behaves closer to an independent or chain pharmacy, so they were not
attributed to either group for the subgroup analysis.

Store Performance on Adherence Measures
Of the 713 pharmacies, 695 had at least one Medicare patient who met eligibility criteria
for one of the adherence measures. When accounting for the minimum patient requirements to be
included in the first two programs, a total of 679 pharmacies met criteria to be included in the
bonus payment strategy (10 patient minimum) whereas 663 met criteria to be included in the
medication adherence strategy (30 patient minimum). A summary of differences between the
two minimum patient requirements can be found in Table 1.
For the bonus payment program (≥10 patient minimum requirement per threshold), the
majority (97.5%) of pharmacies were eligible for all three adherence measures. The diabetes
measure appeared to have fewer patients on average included in the measure. Higher mean store
adherence was observed for the hypertension measure (0.770) compared to the diabetes (0.730)
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and cholesterol (0.715) measures. When comparing mean store adherence between independent
pharmacies and chain store pharmacies, a significantly lower mean adherence was observed in
independent pharmacies for both the hypertension measure (0.753 vs 0.782, p<0. 001) and the
cholesterol measure (0.701 vs 0.726, p<0.001), with no significant difference for the diabetes
measure.
Few meaningful differences were noted when the minimum patient requirement was
increased to ≥30 patients for the medication reimbursement adjustment program. A smaller
percentage of pharmacies eligible for all three adherence measures (85.2%) was observed, likely
the result of a large drop in pharmacies eligible for the diabetes measure. Mean store adherence
remained fairly consistent between adherence measures. A significantly lower mean store
adherence for independent pharmacies compared to chain pharmacies was again observed for
both the hypertension measure (0.755 vs 0.782, p<0.001) and the cholesterol measure (0.702 vs
0.725, p<0.001), whereas no significant difference was observed for the diabetes measure.
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TABLE 4-1. Demographics of Pharmacies Eligible for Store Adherence Programs
≥30 patient minimum per
≥10 patient minimum per
adherence measure
adherence measure
(Medication Reimbursement
(Bonus Payment Program)
Adjustment Program)
Pharmacies Meeting Eligibility Criteria
# eligible for ≥1 adherence measure
679
663
# eligible for ≥2 adherence measure (%)
677 (99.7%)
656 (98.9%)
# eligible for all 3 adherence measures (%)
662 (97.5%)
565 (85.2%)
Diabetes Adherence Measure
# of pharmacies eligible
Mean # of patients included (range)
Mean store adherence (SD)

662
77 (10 to 327)
0.730 (0.081)

565
86 (30 to 327)
0.728 (0.073)

Hypertension Adherence Measure
# of pharmacies eligible
Mean # of patients included (range)
Mean store adherence (SD)

678
197 (10 to 886)
0.770 (0.063)

661
202 (31 to 886)
0.771 (0.059)

Cholesterol Adherence Measure
# of pharmacies eligible
Mean # of patients included (range)
Mean store adherence (SD)

678
197 (10 to 793)
0.715 (0.064)

658
202 (30 to 793)
0.715 (0.061)

Bonus Payment Program
A total of unique 679 pharmacies were eligible to be included for the bonus payment
program once the minimum requirement of 10 eligible patients for a given adherence measure
was accounted for. If implemented, a total of $1.45M would be distributed among 283
pharmacies (41.7% of those eligible) based upon adherence performance scores. Out of those
receiving a bonus, 254 (89.8%) pharmacies would receive bonuses less than $10,000, 27
pharmacies (9.5%) would receive bonuses between $10,000 and $20,000, and 2 pharmacies
(0.7%) would receive bonuses greater than $30,000. The average total payment given to
pharmacies receiving bonuses would be $5,114.
Comparing bonus paid for adherence measures, the hypertension adherence measure
would result in the highest percentage of eligible pharmacies who would receive payment as well
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as the largest sum of total bonuses paid. Approximately $1.10M would be distributed to 33% of
eligible pharmacies for the adherence measure. For pharmacies receiving a bonus through a
given adherence measure, the average bonus would be $1,533 for the diabetes measure, $4,984
for the hypertension measure, and $3,354 for the cholesterol measure. A summary of the bonuses
paid for the program can be found in Table 2.

TABLE 4-2. Description of Rewards for Bonus Payments Program
Total Sample
N (%)

Mean (SD)

Median

Range

Sum of
Bonuses

All Eligible Pharmacies
Total Bonus Payment

679
283 (42%)

$5,114 ($4,470)

$3,990

$360 to $35,940

$1.45M

Diabetes Adherence Measure
No Bonus Payment
Store Adherence ≥0.8 and <0.9
Store Adherence ≥0.9

662
548 (83%)
102 (15%)
12 (2%)

$1,546 ($980)
$1,420 ($735)

$1,395
$1,230

$270 to $4,740
$540 to $3,060

$157,710
$17,040

Hypertension Adherence Measure
No Bonus Payment
Store Adherence ≥0.8 and <0.9
Store Adherence ≥0.9

678
457 (67%)
214 (32%)
7 (1%)

$5,026 ($3,432)
$3,703 ($3,676)

$4,095
$2,940

$240 to $18,480
$780 to $11,520

$1.08M
$25,920

Cholesterol Adherence Measure
No Bonus Payment
Store Adherence ≥0.8 and <0.9
Store Adherence ≥0.9

678
627 (92%)
49 (7%)
2 (<1%)

$3,390 ($3,378)
$2,460 ($2,630)

$2,580
$2,460

$360 to $17,460
$600 to $4,320

$166,110
$4,920

Prescription Volume Comparisons

% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus
Mean Bonusa
(SD)

<30 / day
(n=127)
54.33
$2,070
($1,356)

30-59 / day
(n=255)
40.78
$4,188
($2,493)

Independent vs. Chain Store Comparisons
Independent Pharmacies
(n=283)
% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus
35.69
Mean Bonusa (SD)
$3,848 ($4,038)
a

60-89 / day
(n=161)
39.75
$5,889
($3,133)

≥90 / day
(n=136)
33.82
$10,695
($6,750)

Chain Store Pharmacies
(n=385)
45.97
$6,095 ($4,470)

Only accounting for those receiving a bonus
Chi-Square test used to measure difference between the two groups
c
One way ANOVA used to test differences between groups
d
Independent samples t-test used to test difference of amount of bonus received for pharmacies receiving a bonus
b
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P Value
0.007b
<0.001c

P Value
0.008b
<0.001d

Medication Reimbursement Adjustment Program
A total of unique 663 pharmacies were eligible to be included for the medication
reimbursement adjustment program once the minimum requirement of 30 eligible patients for a
given adherence measure was accounted for. If implemented, a total of 179 pharmacies (27%)
would receive bonuses for their performance while 175 pharmacies (26%) would be penalized.
The sum of bonuses paid would be $172,701 whereas the amount of penalties levied would be
$188,489, resulting in a net savings to the program of $15,789. The average total bonus received
by a pharmacy would be $965 and the average penalty would be $1,077. The average outcome
for pharmacies impacted by the strategy would be a penalty of $45. The maximum amount of
additional compensation paid to a pharmacy would be $4,044, whereas the maximum penalty
levied against a pharmacy would be $5,205.
For the diabetes measure, 70 pharmacies would receive bonuses while 76 would be
penalized. The overall average outcome for pharmacies impacted would be a $135 penalty. For
the hypertension measure, 78 pharmacies would receive bonuses while 82 would be penalized.
The overall average outcome for pharmacies impacted would be a $21 penalty. For the
cholesterol measure, 98 would receive bonuses while 100 would be penalized. The overall
average outcome for pharmacies impacted would be a $38 bonus. The diabetes measure resulted
in both the highest reward ($4,044) and penalty ($4,401) attributed to a pharmacy across all three
measures. A summary of the rewards and penalties associated with strategy can be found in
Table 3.
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TABLE 4-3. Description of Rewards & Penalties for Medication Reimbursement Adjustment Program
Total Sample
Sum of
Rewards
N (%)
Mean (SD)
Median
Range
&
Penalties
All Eligible Pharmacies
663
Total Pharmacies Impacted
354 (53%)
-$45 ($1,448)
$39
-$5,205 to $4,044 -$15,789
Diabetes Adherence Measure
+2% Bonus (≥2 SD)
+1% Bonus (≥1SD, <2SD)
No Bonus / Penalty
-1% Penalty (≤1 SD, >2SD)
-2% Penalty (≤2 SD)

565
6 (1%)
64 (11%)
419 (74%)
51 (9%)
25 (4%)

$1,263 ($627)
$1,607 ($754)
-$1,592 ($836)
-$1,957 ($1,109)

$1,201
$1,462
-$1,516
-$1,617

$457 to $2,151
$498 to $4,044
-$3,696 to -$237
-$4,401 to -$366

$7,580
$102,857
-$81,175
-$48,935

Hypertension Adherence Measure
+2% Bonus (≥2 SD)
+1% Bonus (≥1SD, <2SD)
No Bonus / Penalty
-1% Penalty (≤1 SD, >2SD)
-2% Penalty (≤2 SD)

661
6 (1%)
72 (11%)
491 (74%)
73 (11%)
19 (3%)

$307 ($267)
$224 ($148)
-$209 ($149)
-$242 ($249)

$186
$191
-$167
-$296

$76 to $647
$8 to $666
-$873 to -$26
-$1,050 to -$33

$1,841
$16,141
-$15,260
-$6,300

Cholesterol Adherence Measure
+2% Bonus (≥2 SD)
+1% Bonus (≥1SD, <2SD)
No Bonus / Penalty
-1% Penalty (≤1 SD, >2SD)
-2% Penalty (≤2 SD)

658
5 (1%)
93 (14%)
460 (70%)
84 (13%)
16 (2%)

$394 ($371)
$493 ($369)
-$366 ($229)
-$602 ($462)

$284
$371
-$329
-$485

$91 to $998
$49 to $1,880
-$1,438 to -$36
-$1,875 to -$117

$1,972
$45,883
-$30,764
-$9,627

Prescription Volume Comparisons

% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus
% Pharmacies Penalized
Mean Bonusa
(SD)
Mean Penaltya
(SD)

<30 / day
(n=111)
34.23
33.33
$226
($196)
-$510
($747)

30-59 / day
(n=255)
28.24
29.80
$773
($720)
-$816
($732)

Independent vs. Chain Store Comparisons
Independent Pharmacies
(n=271)
% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus
23.99
% Pharmacies Penalized
36.16
Mean Bonusa (SD)
$859 ($826)
Mean Penaltya (SD)
-$904 ($1,115)
a

60-89 / day
(n=161)
27.33
25.47
$1,356
($813)
-$1,765
($1,354)

Chain Store Pharmacies
(n=383)
29.24
19.32
$1,027 ($939)
-$1,324($1,165)

Only accounting for those receiving a bonus / penalty
Chi-Square test used to measure difference between the two groups
c
One way ANOVA used to test differences between groups
d
Independent samples t-test used to test difference of bonus / penalty for pharmacies receiving a bonus / penalty
b
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≥90 / day
(n=136)
18.38
15.44
$1,951
($972)
-$1,679
($1,588)

P Value
0.041b
0.005b
<0.001c
<0.001c

P Value
0.136b
<0.001b
0.234d
0.017d

Limited Network Program
A total of 713 MS retail pharmacies were identified in the analysis with an average of 22
individual plans associated with each pharmacy. Of the 713 pharmacies, 6 (1%) only had 1
Medicare plan associated with the pharmacy, 4 (1%) were associated with between 2 and 9
plans, 193 (27%) were associated with between 10 and 19 plans, 444 (62%) were associated with
between 20 and 29 plans, 64 (9%) were associated with between 30 and 39 plans, and 2 (<1%)
were associated with greater than 40 plans. On average, pharmacies’ Medicare business
accounted for 782 patients, 21,876 prescriptions, and $1.34M worth of drug costs. Out of the 713
total pharmacies, 712 were included in the analysis to determine impact of a limited network for
the largest plan and median plan. One pharmacy was excluded as the only Medicare plan
associated with the pharmacy was a LI NET plan. The summary of the limited network program
results can be found in Table 4.
Overall, the loss of pharmacies’ largest Medicare plan would account for a loss of
approximately 24% of unique Medicare beneficiaries, 26% of total Medicare prescriptions, and
29% of their total Medicare drug costs. Conversely, the loss of a pharmacy’s median Medicare
plan would account for a loss of 3% of total Medicare business across the three groups.
Significant differences were observed for prescription volume groups for associated drugs costs
of both largest and median Medicare plans. When comparing independent pharmacies to chain
pharmacies, the relative impact of a loss of either the largest or the median Medicare plan was
significantly higher for independent pharmacies. This reflects the mean number of distinct
Medicare plans associated with both groups: 19.5 plans for independent pharmacies and 24.5
plans for chain store pharmacies (p<0.001). It is of note the loss of an independent pharmacy’s
median Medicare plan was approximately double that of chain stores’ median plan.
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TABLE 4-4. Description of Results for Limited Network Program
Total Sample
Mean (SD)

Mean % of Total
Medicare (SD)

Range

Largest Medicare Plans
# of patients
# of prescriptions
Associated drug costs

186 (136)
5,587 (4,289)
$374,308 ($420,530)

24.28 (9.38)
25.88 (9.89)
28.95 (9.98)

1 to 840
1 to 42,609
$41 to $8.56M

Median Medicare Plans
# of patients
# of prescriptions
Associated drug costs

16 (12)
441 (367)
$24,070 ($26,737)

3.27 (8.46)
3.19 (8.57)
2.90 (8.72)

1 to 94
1 to 4,089
$41 to $557,152

Prescription Volume Comparisons
<30 / day
30-59 / day
(n=161)
(n=255)
Largest Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD)
# of patients
25.59 (16.17)
23.55 (6.34)
# of prescriptions
27.68 (16.60)
25.42 (7.27)
Associated drug costs
32.27 (15.82)
28.83 (7.67)

60-89 / day
(n=161)

≥90 / day
(n=136)

P Valuea

23.64 (5.49)
25.10 (5.91)
27.48 (6.73)

24.89 (6.36)
25.56 (6.67)
27.00 (6.78)

0.113
0.071
<0.001

Median Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD)
# of patients
6.98 (17.17)
2.61 (1.64)
# of prescriptions
6.93 (17.44)
2.53 (1.50)
Associated drug costs
6.36 (17.92)
2.22 (0.94)

2.01 (1.29)
1.93 (1.18)
1.75 (0.87)

1.62 (1.21)
1.53 (1.09)
1.48 (0.89)

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Independent vs. Chain Store Comparisons
Independent
Pharmacies (n=307)
Largest Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD)
# of patients
26.47 (11.99)
# of prescriptions
28.91 (12.68)
Associated drug costs
32.77 (12.44)
Median Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD)
# of patients
4.68 (12.57)
# of prescriptions
4.63 (12.77)
Associated drug costs
4.36 (13.09)
a

Chain Store
Pharmacies (n=394)

P Valueb

22.58 (6.35)
23.55 (6.22)
25.93 (6.21)

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

2.18 (1.94)
2.09 (1.78)
1.78 (1.03)

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

One way ANOVA used to test differences between groups
Independent samples t-test used to test difference between groups

b

Further analysis on the plans with the largest contribution to drug costs for retail
pharmacies found the top 5 Medicare plans accounted for approximately 66% of all Medicare
drug costs within the state. Furthermore, at least one of the top 5 plans were observed in 709
pharmacies (99%), whereas all 5 top plans were accounted for in 695 pharmacies (97%). A top 5

73

plan was also observed as an individual pharmacy’s largest Medicare plan in 672 pharmacies
(94%). On average, the accumulation of the top 5 plans accounted for 66% of individual
pharmacies’ total Medicare drug costs.

Discussion

The results of this study help provide context to the financial impact of VBI programs
health insurance plans may implement for pharmacies within their network. This study is one of
the first known studies to estimate outcomes from three possible VBI programs using Medicare
claims data. Actual programs may differ in practice, such as the inclusion of additional storelevel measures (e.g., complete medication review) or differences in eligibility and payment
structures (e.g., all pharmacies meeting a minimum threshold eligible to “compete” for a pool of
bonuses among all other pharmacies in the network). Regardless, the possible scenarios depicted
through the study provide a foundation for pharmacists and researchers to understand how
community pharmacies may be impacted with the increasing shift to value-based models of care.
The outcomes of the first two programs, bonus payments and medication reimbursement
adjustment, were based on medication adherence performance measures. When comparing
between the two minimum patient requirements for each program, it is worth noting the
relatively minimal differences for both pharmacy eligibility and mean store adherence, with an
exception for store eligibility for the diabetes measure. The 15% drop in number of pharmacies
eligible when moving to the higher patient requirement is reflective of the generally overall
smaller number of eligible patients present in the measure compared to the other two measures.
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When considering independent pharmacies and chain store pharmacies, the fewer patients
generally associated with independent pharmacies and ability to implement store-level changes
without corporate approval (e.g., chain stores) might be expected to translate into better
individual patient care and adherence. However, the study observed a significantly lower store
adherence in the hypertension and cholesterol measures for independent pharmacies compared to
chain pharmacies. The results were reflected in the bonuses and penalties distributed across both
the bonus payment and medication reimbursement programs. The study’s results differ from that
of Kalsekar et al.’s (2007), a retrospective cohort study evaluating Medicaid claims data which
found a higher prevalence of adherent patients associated with independent pharmacies
compared to chain pharmacies for oral hypoglycemic agents. While the two different patient
populations of the two studies (i.e., Medicaid vs. Medicare) may account for some portion of the
different study results, the recent consideration and implementation of VBI programs may also
have resulted in chain stores placing a greater emphasis on medication adherence than in
previous years. Future research should seek to further understand the differences between these
two types of pharmacies and additional variables which may explain potential differences in
store adherence, including geographical differences (i.e., urban vs. rural) and whether riskadjustment may minimalize these differences (Dharmarajan et al., 2014).
Overall, less than half of pharmacies would receive additional compensation through the
bonus payment program as designed. While pre-defined goals were set for the strategy, a plan
could choose to adjust the thresholds based upon actual store adherence, such as decrease the
thresholds for the diabetes and cholesterol measure since relatively few pharmacies were eligible
for a bonus for each measure (17% and 8%, respectively). For those pharmacies that would
currently require large improvements to achieve a bonus payment (e.g., store adherence ~0.7)
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and thus may be less likely to try to improve performance, reducing thresholds might result in
more of an incentive to achieve higher ratings. However, if a plan did not want to pay more than
$1.45M already accounted for in the program, this would require a decrease in the amount per
compliant patient paid as more pharmacies became eligible for a bonus. That said, it is unclear
whether the average payment of $5,114 may be enough to incentive pharmacies. Considering
plans can receive billions of dollars for achieving higher Star Ratings (Galewitz, 2016), it may be
more favorable to plans to do so when striving for the highest ratings.
The medication reimbursement program resulted in a more favorable outcome for health
plans through balancing of rewards and penalties to pharmacies. Approximately half of all
pharmacies were impacted, although the impact was noticeably less than the bonus payment
strategy. The highest penalizations and highest bonuses were relatively minimal given the
amount of Medicare dollars associated with pharmacies. A health plan could choose to utilize
additional levels of bonus / penalty (e.g., ±0.5%, ±1.5%) to further incentivize pharmacies.
Additionally, the amount of bonus / penalty attributed could be increased to create greater
degrees of positive reinforcement (bonus) and negative punishment (penalty) (McLeod, 2007).
While the bonuses / penalties were constrained to the drug costs associated with eligible patients,
some plans could also choose to provide a bonus or penalty for all drug costs associated with a
given Medicare plan. Considering the mean drug costs associated with pharmacies’ largest drug
plan was $374,308, just an 1% impact could result in either a gain or loss of $37,431, resulting in
a larger impact to the pharmacy.
While no performance metrics (e.g., store adherence) were used to describe impact of a
limited network program, pharmacists should still take note of how a given Medicare plan may
affect individual store business if the pharmacy is excluded from the network. While a “typical”
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(median) Medicare plan may only affect approximately 3% of a pharmacy’s Medicare business,
additional negative consequences can occur not described in this study. For example, a loss of
one Medicare plan may cause a negative feedback loop which results in fewer recommendations
to the pharmacy and an impact on overall business, Medicare or otherwise. Furthermore, it
should be noted the top 5 Medicare plans accounted for 66% of all Medicare business in
community pharmacies. Pharmacists should take care in considering the patients associated with
their top plans, as they are in a better position to implement VBI programs and will have the
largest impact on individual stores.

Assumptions and Limitations

For the bonus payment and medication reimbursement adjustment programs, all
Medicare plans were used to analyze individual store performance and model the outcomes of
the programs. In actual practice, different Medicare plans may implement different programs
(including none at all) and less store-level data will be available for each plan. This will result in
diminished outcomes than what was shown within this study. Additionally, programs
implemented may be much more complex, including both adjustments to medication
reimbursement and providing bonus payment at the same time. Still, the purpose of the study
was to provide an initial view at how a set of basic programs could impact pharmacies, not
provide an accurate forecast of actual impact to community pharmacies.
It should also be noted a general limitation of utilizing insurance claims data to measure
patient adherence is the lack of available information on prescriptions paid for by cash.
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Considering the three adherence measure have an abundance of generic options which are
associated with low cash out-of-pocket costs for patients, overall adherence of patients may have
been underestimated.

Conclusion

Although health plans have started adopting different programs to try to incentivize
community pharmacies to improve performance on quality metrics such as patient adherence,
little research has been conducted to understand the potential impact on pharmacies from these
programs. As VBI models are implemented for community pharmacy, it will be imperative for
pharmacists to be proactive in understanding potential impact to their stores. This study presents
an evaluation of how three distinct programs may impact community pharmacies. Additional
research is warranted to provide further insight into the programs being implemented and a
detailed analysis of the impact to pharmacies affected. Doing so may help pharmacists and health
plans alike in cooperatively designing VBI programs which benefit both parties.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Conclusions

This dissertation explores the impact of CMS’ Medicare Star Ratings program on retail
pharmacies. Currently, health plans are implementing different value-based incentive (VBI)
programs to try to incentivize pharmacies to achieve higher performance ratings on quality
measures, particularly those related to star ratings. Despite the present changes occurring in
pharmacy associated with VBI programs, little research has been conducted to understand the
relative impact on retail pharmacies. This dissertation sought to provide a greater understanding
of this impact through three specific goals: 1) identifying potential VBI programs being
implemented and defining a conceptual framework of the strategies being employed with each
VBI program; 2) understanding retail pharmacists’ attitudes and perceptions of quality measure
and impact of potential VBI programs; and 3) evaluate the potential financial impact of select
VBI programs on retail pharmacies.
The first paper (Chapter 2) provides a categorization of potential VBI strategies being
employed through various VBI programs. The paper defines three distinct strategies: qualitybased payment (QBP), value-based contracting (VBC), and quality-based network (QBN). Each
strategy presents a distinct way health plans are attempting to improve quality performance
ratings from retail pharmacies. Furthermore, the paper identifies 5 distinct VBI programs being
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considered or already implemented which reflect the strategies defined in the categorization of
VBI strategies and characteristics of how they may be implemented in practice. A survey was
used to support the collection on information on potential programs being considered or
implemented. The paper compares identified strategies and programs to established theory in
human behavior research (operant conditioning). Overall, the paper helps provide a more
cohesive understanding of how certain dynamics of the health plan-retail pharmacy relationship
are evolving to place an emphasis on quality performance ratings through VBI programs.
The second paper (Chapter 3) explores retail pharmacy’s perception of these changing
dynamics. Pharmacy managers from both independent and chain retail pharmacies who were
actively engaged in understanding and adapting to quality performance ratings were interviewed.
While several concerns were voiced regarding the resources required and change necessary to
achieve high ratings, the respondents generally favored the impact of quality measures on the
profession of pharmacy and the quality of care provided to patients. While research has
previously been conducted understanding the perceptions of the lay retail pharmacist on star
ratings, this paper provides a more nuanced perspective of those being proactive in addressing
how quality performance ratings may affect retail pharmacy practice. In doing so, this paper adds
to the literature by adding a more robust discussion of pharmacist attitudes and opinions of the
changes occurring due to the environment’s shifting focus toward incentivizing high-quality
performance ratings.
The third paper (Chapter 4) evaluates the financial impact to retail pharmacies of possible
VBI programs. Three examples of VBI programs were developed and their outcomes estimated
in Mississippi Medicare claims data. The research provides the first look at how pharmacies may
be rewarded or penalized based upon their performance. Particularly, the financial impact from a
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pharmacy losing their largest Medicare contract demonstrates the need for retail pharmacies to
pay close attention to the VBI programs being implemented within the health plans of their
patients. While programs implemented in practice may differ than those evaluated in the
research, the outcomes still provide a foundation for pharmacists and health plans to discuss the
impact of VBI programs and cooperatively design programs which benefit both parties.

Implications for Future Research

The research associated with this dissertation was conducted with the goal of providing a
greater understanding to how retail pharmacy is being impacted by healthcare’s shift toward
achieving high quality performance ratings. While the research represents a meaningful step
forward in understanding the impact of VBI programs on the retail pharmacy, there remains
much to understand. While five distinct VBI programs were identified, additional programs are
likely to be developed. The three strategies proposed through this research should serve as a
foundation to help explain different programs, and if needed additional strategies can be
considered as new ways for health plans and pharmacies to collaborate are established. Future
research should attempt to provide even more detailed information on implemented VBI
strategies to help guide researchers as well as provide examples for stakeholders to use when
designing new VBI programs. Research should continue to understand pharmacists’ perspective
of VBI programs. Specifically, better understanding relationships between financial incentives
and pharmacist willingness to engage in improving quality performance ratings would be
worthwhile in the development of VBI programs. Furthermore, such research might help
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elucidate additional ways for health plans to engage with pharmacists which benefit both parties.
Finally, as new VBI programs are identified, research should continue to try to estimate the
potential financial impact on retail pharmacies to help pharmacists understand the potential
implications on their practice.
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Payer Survey

Q1 Thank you for your interest in the study. We believe your insight will be valuable to
understanding how health insurance plans are evaluating and interacting with community
pharmacy practice in response to quality performance measures. Before we begin, please answer
the following questions to ensure that you are eligible to complete the survey.

Q2 What is your title within the health plan?
________________________________________________________________

Q3 Approximately how many total lives are covered under your plan?
________________________________________________________________

Q4 Which type of lives does your plan cover? (Click all that apply)

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

Commercial lives (1)
Medicare Advantage (MA) lives (2)
Medicare Advantage with Part D (MA-PD) lives (3)
Part D only (PD) lives (4)
Medicaid Managed Care lives (5)
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Q5

Q6 Using the graphic above, please select all regions where you have covered lives.

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

⊗All regions

(19)

Northeast (15)
South (16)
Midwest (17)
West (18)
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Q7 Do your job responsibilities include understanding quality performance ratings of the
pharmacies within your health plan's network?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q8 How knowledgeable are you about whether your plan has considered or implemented various
strategies such as pay-for-performance (i.e. bonus payments) or quality-based networks (i.e.
pharmacies included based on performance) to try to boost quality performance ratings from
pharmacies within the health plan's network?

o Extremely knowledgeable (1)
o Very knowledgeable (2)
o Moderately knowledgeable (3)
o Slightly knowledgeable (4)
o Not knowledgeable at all (5)
(IF RESPONDENT FAILED SCREENER CRITERIA)
Q9 Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this research. However, you do not
appear to meet the criteria to participate, which includes job responsibilities of understanding
how your plan evaluates quality performance ratings for pharmacies in your network. If you
know of someone that meets this criteria, please consider directing them to this survey. If you
feel that you do indeed meet the criteria, please contact the study author, Tristen Jackson, at
thjackso@go.olemiss.edu, to discuss the possibility of still participating.

(IF RESPONDENT PASSED SCREENER CRITERIA)
Q10 Your responses indicate you are eligible to participate in this study. Please read each of the
following 4 pages carefully and answer the questions. Your participation in this study is crucial
to understanding how health insurance plans are evaluating pharmacy quality performance
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measures and implementing strategies to try to encourage pharmacies to try to improve their own
performance.
Q11
Page 1 of 4

Q12 Please carefully read through this brief background of quality performance measures
and strategies to boost pharmacy quality performance ratings.
Increasingly, health plans are taking an interest in the quality of care community pharmacies
deliver. Quality of care is reflected through specific quality performance measures that are
assessed through administrative claims data associated with the pharmacy. While quality
measures associated with CMS Star Ratings (i.e. medication adherence for non-insulin diabetes
medications) are those most likely to be utilized in measuring pharmacy performance, some
plans include additional measures such as percentage of generics products dispensed over brand
products (where applicable) or the number of 90 day medication supplies dispensed for chronic
medications.
Regardless of the specific quality measures being assessed, many plans have begun to implement
various strategies to try to boost the performance of these measures for the pharmacies in their
network. These “incentive” strategies appear to generally align with one of three primary
categories:
•

Pay-for-Performance (P4P)
o Bonus payments or compensation is given based upon performance scores.

•

Value-Based Contracting
o Contracting with pharmacies is altered based upon pharmacy performance. This
can include decreasing the direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees associated
with pharmacy contracting or altering medication reimbursement that a pharmacy
receives in accordance to performance scores
Quality-Based Networks (QBN)
o Poorly performing pharmacies are either placed on a “non-preferred” tier where
patients pay higher copays to visit, or completely removed from the network if
performance is too low. These strategies indirectly affect pharmacies by shifting
where patients are likely to get their medications filled.

•

Given all this, please read and respond to the following prompts.
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Q13 Given the description above of the three primary strategies, please rate how effective you
believe each type of strategy (used alone) would be in increasing quality performance ratings of
retail pharmacies.
Not effective at
all (1)

Slightly
effective (2)

Moderately
effective (3)

Very effective
(4)

Extremely
effective (5)

Pay-forPerformance
(P4P) (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Value-Based
Contracting (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Quality-Based
Networks
(QBN) (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Q14
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Q15
Quality Performance Ratings
Please review through the following potential quality performance ratings and indicate whether
the potential measure is:
• Used to influence payment decisions of pharmacies in your network (i.e. bonus
payments, DIR fees, medication reimbursement)
• Used to influence network decisions of pharmacies in your network (i.e. preferred vs.
non-preferred pharmacies, removing pharmacy from network)
• Used only to monitor pharmacy performance, but not to make payment or network
decisions from; or
• Not monitored at the pharmacy level
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Q16 CMS Part D Measures
Influences
pharmacy payment
decisions (1)
Medication
adherence for noninsulin diabetes
medications (1)
Medication
adherence for
hypertension
medications (RAS
antagonists) (2)
Medication
adherence for
cholesterol
medications
(statins) (3)
Medication therapy
management
(MTM) program
completion rate for
comprehensive
medication reviews
(CMRs) (5)
Ensuring statin use
in patients with
diabetes age 40 to
75 years (display
measure for 2017)
(7)

Influences
pharmacy network
decisions (2)

Only monitored at
pharmacy level (3)

Not monitored at
pharmacy level (4)

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢
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Q17 CMS Part D Display Measures
Influences
pharmacy payment
decisions (1)
Avoidance of drugdrug interactions (1)
Avoidance of
excessive doses of
oral diabetes
medications (2)
Ensuring statin use
in patients with
diabetes age 40 to
75 years (display
measure for 2017)
(3)
Appropriate use of
high risk
medications in
patients 65 years or
older (4)

Influences
pharmacy network
decisions (2)

Only monitored at
pharmacy level (3)

Not monitored at
pharmacy level (4)

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

Q18 Part C Measures
Influences
pharmacy payment
decisions (1)
Osteoporosis
management in
women who have
had a fracture (2)

Influences
pharmacy network
decisions (2)

Only monitored at
pharmacy level (3)

Not monitored at
pharmacy level (4)

▢

▢

▢

▢

Glucose control in
diabetes patients (3)

▢

▢

▢

▢

Blood pressure
control (4)

▢

▢

▢

▢
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Q19 Part C Display Measures
Influences
pharmacy payment
decisions (1)
Administration of
pneumococcal
vaccine (where
appropriate) (1)
Drug treatment of
COPD with
bronchodilators or
systemic
corticosteroids as
appropriate (2)

Influences
pharmacy network
decisions (2)

Only monitored at
pharmacy level (3)

Not monitored at
pharmacy level (4)

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

Q20 Other
Influences
pharmacy payment
decisions (1)

Influences
pharmacy network
decisions (2)

Only monitored at
pharmacy level (3)

Not monitored at
pharmacy level (4)

Patient experience
in getting a needed
medication (Part of
CAHPS) (7)

▢

▢

▢

▢

Annual influenza
vaccine (Part of
CAHPS) (8)

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

▢

Number of 90 day
supplies dispensed
for chronic
medications (2)

▢

▢

▢

▢

If applicable, please
designate any other
measures: (3)

▢

▢

▢

▢

If applicable, please
designate any other
measures: (4)

▢

▢

▢

▢

If applicable, please
designate any other
measures: (5)

▢

▢

▢

▢

If applicable, please
designate any other
measures: (6)

▢

▢

▢

▢

Percentage of
generic products
dispensed over
brand products
(where applicable)
(1)
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Q21
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Q22 This page will describe five specific pharmacy performance strategies that health plans may
adopt to try to increase quality performance ratings of retail pharmacies.
One of the most common ways that these five strategies can differ is whether they utilize a
“threshold” or “tournament” type of performance measure evaluation. For each scenario,
"threshold", "tournament", and "both threshold and tournament" systems are defined as such:
• Threshold system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon whether the pharmacy
meets specific thresholds (i.e. at least 90% of patients being adherent to oral diabetes
medications or at least 85% of patients being adherent to all three medication adherence
quality measures).
• Tournament system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon how pharmacies'
quality performance ratings compare to other pharmacies within a specified network
within the plan. In this type of system, the best performing pharmacies would receive the
highest bonus payment in a P4P strategy or the lowest DIR fee assessed in a value-based
contracting strategy.
• Both threshold and tournament system: A mixture of both systems. An example would
be that all pharmacies that meet a certain threshold are in competition for bonus payments
through a pay-for-performance strategy. Pharmacies that don't meet the threshold might
either not be eligible for rewards or may be eligible for negative outcomes.
Please read through each scenario and respond to the prompts.

Q23 Pay-for-Performance Strategies

Q24 P4P Strategy 1
Pharmacies receive bonus payments based upon their quality performance ratings.
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Q25 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be.
Not effective at
all (1)

Slightly
effective (2)

Moderately
effective (3)

Very effective
(4)

Extremely
effective (5)

Bonus
incentives with
threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Bonus
incentives with
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Bonus
incentives with
both threshold
and tournament
system (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Q26 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted".
Likelihood to adopt
Definitely
not (1)

Probably not
(2)

Might or
might not (3)

Probably yes
(4)

Definitely
yes (5)

Already
adopted (1)

Bonus
incentives
with
threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Bonus
incentives
with
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Bonus
incentives
with both
threshold and
tournament
system (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Q27 Value-Based Contracting Strategies

Q28 Value-Based Contracting Strategy 1
Direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees, those fees that pharmacies must pay to participate
in a given network, are altered (typically lowered) based upon pharmacy quality performance
ratings.

Q29 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be.
Not effective at
all (1)

Slightly
effective (2)

Moderately
effective (3)

Very effective
(4)

Extremely
effective (5)

DIR fee altered
based on
threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

DIR fee altered
based on
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

DIR fee altered
based on both
threshold and
tournament
system (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Q30 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted".
Likelihood to adopt
Definitely
not (1)

Probably not
(2)

Might or
might not (3)
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Probably yes
(4)

Definitely
yes (5)

Already
adopted (1)

DIR fee
altered based
on threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

DIR fee
altered based
on
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

DIR fee
altered based
on both
threshold and
tournament
system (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Q31 Value-Based Contracting Strategy 2
Reimbursement of medications is either increased or decreased based upon pharmacy quality
performance ratings.

Q32 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be.
Not effective at
all (1)

Slightly
effective (2)

Moderately
effective (3)

Very effective
(4)

Extremely
effective (5)

Medication
reimbursement
alteration with
threshold system
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

Medication
reimbursement
alteration with
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Medication
reimbursement
alteration with
both threshold
and tournament
system (3)

o

o

o

o

o
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Q33 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted".
Likelihood to adopt
Definitely
not (1)

Probably not
(2)

Might or
might not (3)

Probably yes
(4)

Definitely
yes (5)

Already
adopted (1)

Medication
reimbursement
alteration with
threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Medication
reimbursement
alteration with
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Medication
reimbursement
alteration with
both threshold
and
tournament
system (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Q34 Quality-Based Networks Strategies

Q35 QBN Strategy 1
Pharmacies in a health plan's network are classified as either "preferred" or "non-preferred"
pharmacies based upon quality performance ratings. Patients receive incentives (i.e. lower
copays) for going to "preferred" pharmacies instead of "non-preferred" ones. We will refer to this
as the "tiered structure".
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Q36 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be.
Not effective at
all (1)

Slightly
effective (2)

Moderately
effective (3)

Very effective
(4)

Extremely
effective (5)

Tiered structure
with threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Tiered structure
with tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Q37 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted".
Likelihood to adopt
Definitely
not (1)

Probably not
(2)

Might or
might not (3)

Probably yes
(4)

Definitely
yes (5)

Already
adopted (1)

Tiered
structure with
threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Tiered
structure with
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Q38 QBN Strategy 2
Lowest-performing pharmacies in a health plan's network are excluded from the network.* This
is sometimes referred to as "narrow networks".
*It is understood that due to patient access considerations, not all "low-performing" pharmacies
could be excluded from the network. Please answer effectivness questions assuming access
considerations are not an issue and implementation questions considering these realistic
concerns.
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Q39 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be.

For this statement, please consider how effectively you believe it would "incentivize"
pharmacies to increase their quality performance ratings, not whether by excluding lowperforming pharmacies that it would increase the plan's overall ratings.
Not effective at
all (1)

Slightly
effective (2)

Moderately
effective (3)

Very effective
(4)

Extremely
effective (5)

Narrow network
with threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Narrow network
with tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Q40 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted".
Likelihood to adopt
Definitely
not (1)

Probably not
(2)

Might or
might not (3)

Probably yes
(4)

Definitely
yes (5)

Already
adopted (1)

Narrow
network with
threshold
system (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Narrow
network with
tournament
system (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Q41
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Q42 Please rate your likelihood to adopt a case-mix adjustment for pharmacies as you evaluate
quality performance ratings (i.e. factoring in sociodemographic information of the patient
population that the pharmacy serves).
Likelihood to adopt
Definitely
not (1)
Use of casemix
adjustment
(1)

o

Probably not
(2)

o

Might or
might not (3)

o
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Probably yes
(4)

o

Definitely
yes (5)

o

Already
adopted (1)

o

Display This Question:
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... : =
Already adopted

Q43 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a pay-for-performance (P4P) strategy for
pharmacies in your network.

In a few sentences, please briefly describe how bonuses are determined. (i.e. what level of
performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in a network alters bonus amount,
what is an approximate bonus amount for various levels of performance?)
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... : =
Already adopted

Q44 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a value-based contracting strategy for
pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a DIR fee adjustment strategy.

In a few sentences, please briefly describe how DIR fees are adjusted. (i.e. what level of
performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in a network alters fee, what what
is an approximate amount of DIR fee altered for various levels of performance?)
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Display This Question:
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... : =
Already adopted

Q45 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a value-based contracting strategy for
pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a medication reimbursement
adjustment strategy.

In a few sentences, please briefly describe how mediation reimbursements are adjusted. (i.e.
what level of performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in a network alters
fee, what what is an approximate amount of medication reimbursement altered for various levels
of performance?)
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... : =
Already adopted

Q46 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a quality-based network (QBN) strategy
for pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a tiered structure (preferred vs. nonpreferred) strategy.

In a few sentences, please briefly describe how pharmacies are delegated to different levels of
"preference". (i.e. what level of performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in
a network alters tier structure placement, what incentives are there for patients to visit a
"preferred" pharmacy?)
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Display This Question:
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... : =
Already adopted

Q47 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a quality-based network (QBN) strategy
for pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a narrow network (i.e. network
lockout) strategy.

In a few sentences, please briefly describe the decision-making process to how pharmacies are
removed from the network. (i.e. what level of performance ratings need to be met, how level of
performance in a network affects network inclusion, are there opportunities for a pharmacy to
rejoin the network?)
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

(SHOW AT CONCLUSION OF SURVEY)
Q48 This concludes the survey. Thank you for your contribution to understanding how health
plans are evaluating quality performance ratings and implementing performance strategies for
pharmacies in their network.
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APPENDIX B: Pharmacist Interview Guide
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Pharmacist Interview Guide
The purpose of the following interview is to understand the opinions and perspectives of retail
pharmacists to performance strategies being implemented by health plans and Pharmacy Based
Managers (PBMs).
This research as been approved by the University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board
(IRB). There are no identifiable risks associated with this study. The interview will be recorded
so that you and I can talk casually, without the need for taking notes. You and the pharmacy you
represent will remain completely anonymous for your participation in this project. You have the
right to withdraw at any point in the interview. If you decide at any point you do not want to
finish the interview, let me know and the interview will conclude at once. You also have the right
to skip any questions you prefer not to answer. By conducting this interview, you are giving your
explicit consent to participate in this study, and for use of what you have to say to be used in the
analysis of this study, as well as for dissemination of study results. By conducting this interview,
you are additionally giving explicit permission to use anonymous quotes from our conversation
in dissemination of results.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
Guide
1. How well do you feel you understand the incentive strategies that plans and PBMs are
implementing to boost pharmacy performance ratings?
a. What aspects/components do you wish you knew more about?
2. How do you assess your own quality performance ratings?
a. Are there any internal systems of assessment?
b. Do you use a third-party, such as EQUiPP?
3. What are your thoughts on whether achieving higher quality performance scores is good
for patients or not?
4. What barriers are there for pharmacies to meet quality performance targets?
a. Are the targets realistic?
b. Do pharmacists have enough control in the interaction with the patient to achieve
high performance scores? Why or why not?
c. What additional resources do you believe would be needed to achieve the highest
quality performance targets?
d. Describe your thoughts on whether pharmacy practice sites have to significantly
alter current practices to meet quality performance targets.

117

5. How much do you think the emphasis on achieving higher quality performance for each
patient facilitates an opportunity for a closer working relationship with other health
professionals?
a. Describe how other healthcare professionals will work with pharmacists to
achieve higher quality performance targets?
b. Which other healthcare professionals do you believe should work with
pharmacists to achieve higher quality performance targets?
6. (Refer to pre-read) Out of the strategies discussed in the pre-read, which of these
strategies have you heard of so far?
a. Which ones have you seen used so far?
b. Have any of the strategies been used within your own pharmacy? If so, which
one(s)?
7. Out of the three strategy types previously described, which do you prefer and why?
8. What are your thoughts on what the positive and negative aspects of the P4P model
would be if it was implemented in part of your organization?
a. Would it be a welcome change?
b. How well do you think P4P models would motivate your pharmacy to meet or
exceed quality performance targets?
9. What are your thoughts on what the positive and negative aspects of the value-based
contracting model would be if it was implemented in part of your organization?
a. Would it be a welcome change?
b. How well do you think value-based contracting models would motivate your
pharmacy to meet or exceed quality performance targets?
10. What are your thoughts on what the positive and negative aspects of the QBN model
would be if it was implemented in part of your organization?
a. Would it be a welcome change?
b. How well do you think QBN models would motivate your pharmacy to meet or
exceed quality performance targets?
11. Under which type of strategy do you believe you would strive to reach the highest quality
targets? (if not already answered in previous questions)
12. Do you believe that there are any other ways that plans can incentivize or help
pharmacies to achieve higher quality performance targets?
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13. Overall, do you believe quality performance strategies are good or bad for the profession?
Why?
a. What’s good about them?
b. What’s bad about them?
14. Is there anything else we have not discussed that you believe would be important to this
discussion?
Thank you very much for your time. You have been incredibly helpful in understanding the field
of pharmacy’s point of view of health plans implementing pharmacy performance strategies.
Once the study is concluded, would you like to receive an executive summary of the findings?
[Conclude]
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President
Secretary
Chairman of Constitutional Reform

May 2013 – May 2014
May 2012 – May 2013
May 2012 – May 2013

Associated Student Body, The University of Mississippi
Co-Chairman of Infrastructure
September 2012 – May 2013
Graduate Senator Representative
March 2012 – May 2013
Governmental/ External Affairs Committee
March 2012 – September 2012
University Development Committee
September 2007 – May 2008
Pharmacy Senator Representative
September 2007 – May 2008
Student Involvement Committee
August 2006 – May 2007
Elections Committee
August 2006 – May 2007
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Chancellor’s Standing Committees, The University of Mississippi
University Appellate Consideration Board
May 2014 – May 2015
Strategic Council
May 2013 – May 2014
Academic Appeals Committee
May 2013 – May 2014
Vice-Chancellors Student Advisory Council
May 2013 – May 2014
Council of Academic Administrators
August 2012 – May 2014
Recruiting, Admissions, Orientation, & Advising
August 2012 – May 2013
Christ Presbyterian Church, Oxford, MS
Worship Leader
College Hill Presbyterian Church, Oxford, MS
Worship Leader

American Heart Association Heart Walk, Jackson, MS
Co-Chairman of Event Logistics
Campus Crusade for Christ, University of Mississippi
Praise and Worship Team

August 2012 – Present
August 2009 – May 2010
& August 2007 – May 2008
May 2009 – October 2009
December 2006 – May 2008

School of Pharmacy, University of Mississippi
Honor Council Representative

August 2006 – May 2007

Ole Miss Ambassadors, University of Mississippi
Co-Director of Special Events/ Housing
Ambassador

August 2006 – May 2007
August 2005 – May 2006

CHEERS, University of Mississippi
Webpage Chairman

August 2006 – May 2007

RELEVANT COURSEWORK
Applied Longitudinal Modeling, University of Mississippi (Audited)
2016
Instructor: John Bentley, Ph.D., R.Ph.
 Covered methods of data analysis focused on the application of modern
longitudinal data analysis. Discussed the theory and practical application of
multilevel growth modeling, latent growth curve modeling, and several time-toevent models.
Organizational Behavior, University of Mississippi
2015
Instructor: Tony Ammeter, Ph.D., MBA
 Reviewed prominent theory in organizational theory literature. Specific topics of
discussion germane to management theory included personality and individual
differences, motivation, work-related attitudes, organizational behavior,
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leadership, groups and teams, culture and climate, and organizational entry and
socialization. Developed and presented a theoretical proposal on medical team
characteristics and resulting health outcomes.
Theoretical Foundations of Management, University of Mississippi
2014
Instructor: Milorad Novicevic, Ph.D.
 Examined theoretical foundations of the field of management in how they
developed in history. Considered history’s ability to provide insight on new or
existing theory, and how to conduct research using various historical mediums.
Conceptualized and completed three different projects during the course.
Mediation and Moderation, University of Mississippi
2014
Instructor: John Bentley, Ph.D., R.Ph.
 Covered methods of data analysis focused on questions about moderation and
mediation. Discussed estimation, testing, and probing interactions in various
types of models, tested indirect effects in different situations, and developed
experience in SAS and SPSS software in application of these concepts.
Structural Equation Modeling, University of Mississippi (Audited)
2014
Instructor: Doug Vorhies, Ph.D.
 Reviewed theory of Structural Equation Modeling and its application in social
sciences. Furthermore, developed techniques of application through various
statistical software.
Global Business Strategy, University of Mississippi
2014
Instructor: Richard Gentry, Ph.D.
 A seminar-based course, a broad focus of research in various areas of business
strategy was analyzed, including the structure-conduct-performance paradigm,
game theory, resource based theory, theories of organizational knowledge and
learning, transaction cost economics, and evolutionary economics.
Theoretical Foundations of Marketing, University of Mississippi
2013
Instructor: Scott Vitell, Ph.D.
 Discussed the basic elements of what constitutes theory, how theory is developed,
and the characteristics of good theory in the social sciences. Provided a critique
of theory developed in a recent piece of literature.
Human Resource Management, University of Mississippi
2013
Instructor: Walter Davis, Ph.D.
 Evaluated the literature surrounding human resources, including topics areas of
compensation, recruiting and selction, job-work design, employment interviews,
development of HR, performance evaluation and management, employeeorganization relationship, workforce diversity, and mobility and withdrawal of
HR. Constructed a paper on employer branding, its effect on employer
attractiveness, and the moderating role of individual personality in retail
pharmacy employees.
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Drug Development and Marketing, University of Mississippi
2013
Instructors: Allyson Best, M.B.A., & Mick Kolassa, M.B.A., Ph.D.
 Learned how pharmaceutical companies plan and market products during and
after the drug approval process. Conduct analyses on various segments of the
market from both pharmaceutical and policy perspectives.
Applied Multivariate Analysis, University of Mississippi
2013
Instructor: John Bentley, Ph.D., R.Ph.
 Examined multivariate analytical techniques and how to apply to research
methodology, including multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA), repeated
measures ANOVA, discriminant analysis, logistic regression, cluster analysis, and
factor analysis.
Marketing and Management Ethics, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: Scott Vitell, Ph.D.
 Explored deontological ethical decision making models, discussed popular ethical
theories in relation to various aspects of marketing and management (e.g. job
satisfaction, job turnover, etc.), and proposed new antecedents of ethical behavior.
Developed two papers on potential relationships of ethics in the retail pharmacy
setting.
General Linear Models, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: John Bentley, Ph.D., R.Ph.
 Examined basic theory and application of general linear model (GLM) analytical
techniques toward research, including simple and multiple linear regression
analyses.
Secondary Data Techniques, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: Ben Banahan, Ph.D.
 Instructed on various techniques and principles of using secondary data to answer
research questions, including data and data source evaluation, accessing and
preparing secondary databases, and review of common data types and sources.
Also, constructed a white paper on the general lack of national consensus on
medications designated as “specialty drugs.”
Health Economics, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: Yi Yang, M.D., Ph.D.
 Discussed theory and established practices of U.S. health economics, including
current expenditure policy issues, health care reform, and economics of the
uninsured. Additionally, gave a presentation on how the Affordable Care Act
would affect Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) and conducted a study using
national MEPS data for characteristics of the uninsured utilizing the emergency
department (ED).
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Primary Data Techniques, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: David J. McCaffrey, Ph.D., R.Ph.
 Studied primary research techniques related to pharmaceutical marketing and/or
pharmacy management, including sampling, instrument development, and data
collection using several personal interview and self-administered survey
techniques. Working as a team, fielded a national survey exploring pharmacy
faculty stress.
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Policy, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: Erin Holmes, Ph.D., Pharm.D.
 Discussed health care policy and research relating to Medicare, Medicaid, Private
Insurers, how the Affordable Care Act would affect outcomes in current health
care, roles of different health care professionals, whether we were responsibility
allocated health care dollar, etc. Additionally, I completed a policy paper on the
HITECH act and how the Meaningful Use clause could potentially be interpreted
by hospital administrators for health information technology.
Data Management and Statistical Software, University of Mississippi
2012
Instructor: Pat Pace, Ph.D.
 Introduced and instructed to techniques of data management and how to become
proficient in SAS programming for such purposes.
Research Methodology and Techniques, University of Mississippi
2011
Instructor: Donna West-Strum, Ph.D., Pharm.D.
 Examined a broad overview of the research process from project inception to its
conclusion, including problem statement, hypothesis generation and testing,
measurement, research design, sampling theory, data collection and analysis, and
ethical conduct in research.
Pharmacoeconomics, University of Mississippi
2011
Instructor: Yi Yang, M.D., Ph.D.
 Discussed principles and analytical techniques in assessing the overall value of
pharmaceutical products, services, programs, and other health care interventions.
Also, conducted a decision-modeling analysis on using allopurinol vs. febuxostat
for gout.
Quantitative Methods in Psychology I, University of Mississippi
2011
Instructor: Nick Prins, Ph.D.
 Learned basic analysis designs related to descriptive statistics, probability theory,
hypothesis testing, linear regression, analysis of variance, experimental design,
nonparametric and multivariate techniques, and computer application.
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CERTIFICATIONS
Basic Life Support for Healthcare Providers
American Heart Association

March 2008 – May 2012

Medication Therapy Management
American Pharmacists Association

March 2010

Immunization Certification
American Pharmacists Association

October 2008

HIPAA Compliance Training
University of Mississippi Medical Center

SKILLS
Computer Software
 SAS (Proficient), Statistical and administrative claims data analyses
 SPSS (Proficient), Statistical and administrative claims data analyses
 TreeAge (Proficient), Decision modeling
 Microsoft: Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook (Expert)
 Adobe Photoshop (Proficient)
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August 2008

